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1Mixed Messages: The Supreme Court’s Conflicting Decisions on Juries in Death Penalty 
Cases
Were the jury made up of experienced death penalty lawyers, it 
might understand these instructions . . . in the way that the Court 
understands them. – Justice Breyer 1
The right to a jury of one’s peers is fundamental for those accused of criminal 
wrongdoing.  And for those charged with a capital crime, a jury may be all that stands between 
the defendant and a sentence of death.  But a jury that cannot understand the law it must follow 
as set forth in legal instructions cannot fulfill this vital function of democracy, nor does such a 
jury provide a defendant a meaningful 6th Amendment right to a jury trial.  Likewise, a jury pool 
that systematically excludes members of  certain races or individuals with reservations 
concerning the death penalty cannot be said to satisfy the 6th Amendment.  Yet it is almost a 
truism that jurors do not understand their legal instructions and that juries are hardly 
representative bodies.
Jury instructions are, by and large, written by committees of lawyers, or are quoted 
verbatim from statutory or case law, resulting in jargon-ridden language that might be 
understood by lawyers, but is certainly not understood by laypersons.  It is no surprise that social 
scientists have demonstrated repeatedly – in myriad settings using diverse methods – that jurors 
do not understand the instructions that are intended to guide them.  Researchers are not alone 
here; jurors themselves register their confusion by requesting clarification from trial judges.  The 
criminal justice system, however, has been slow to respond, and appellate courts continue to 
“presume” that jurors understand their instructions, even when jurors ask pointed questions 
regarding the meaning of those same instructions.  Moreover, capital proceedings continue, with 
1 Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 283 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2the passive or direct support of the Court, to assemble jury panels dramatically skewed relative to 
the community as a whole.  
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, in a series of decisions beginning with Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,2 has expanded the role of juries in the criminal sentencing process, granting juries many 
powers previously relegated to judges.  After Ring v. Arizona,3 capital juries must be given the 
task of determining whether the prosecution has established the relevant aggravating 
circumstances that would make the defendant eligible for the death penalty.  The Court has also 
decided to expand the role of juries under the federal criminal sentencing guidelines.  We do not 
argue that the expansion of 6th Amendment rights is necessarily bad, but we are concerned with 
and explore the implications of expanding the role of juries in capital, as well as other criminal 
cases, when juries are not given sufficient tools with which to work.  Specifically, juries cannot 
hope to fulfill their duties when they do not understand their instructions, when no effort is made 
to clarify those instructions, and when juries under-represent certain segments of the population.
Our premise here is that the Supreme Court has expanded a defendant’s right to a jury in 
capital cases without commensurate attention to the obligations on government that would make 
that right meaningful.  The legal and social scientific literature is replete with commentary and 
research on the alarming lack of understanding that jurors demonstrate in capital and other 
criminal cases.  The fact that death qualification and voir dire excludes certain members of 
society has been demonstrated repeatedly.  Likewise, the literature is fairly consistent in praising 
the expansion of a criminal defendant’s 6th Amendment rights.  What we show, however, is that 
when these two trends are laid side by side, there is a troubling – even glaring – lack of congruity 
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
3between the expansion of the 6th Amendment on the one hand and any effort to make that right 
meaningful.  
More to the point, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, seem particularly willing to expand 6th
Amendment rights without thought to corresponding governmental obligations to animate that 
right.  The collective jurisprudence of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas in one area is completely 
uninformed by their jurisprudence in another area.  This leads to troubling implications regarding 
the justice of capital and other criminal trials.
The Expanding 6th Amendment
The right to a trial by jury for the criminally accused is guaranteed by the 6th
Amendment.  But what is the nature of that right?  It is not enough to say that the jury determines 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence, for the 6th Amendment means much more – and less – than 
the mere determination of guilt.  Indeed, the nature and extent of a criminal defendant’s right to a 
jury has changed considerably over time.  It was not until 1970, when the Court decided In re 
Winship, that the familiar “reasonable doubt” standard became a constitutionally required 
element of criminal due process.4  The Court, after reflecting on a long tradition of using the 
reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials in the United States, found it necessary to state, 
“[l]est there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, 
we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 
he is charged.”5  After Winship , then, a criminal defendant appeared to have a constitutional right 
to a jury determination of his or her guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”6
4 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
5 Id. at 364.
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 Even the foundational question regarding how many members are required to form a jury has been 
subject to stark revision.  After what the Court found to be several hundred years of established practice 
4The Court, in an opinion written by Rehnquist, muddied the water, however, in McMillan 
v. Pennsylvania (1986),7 when it failed to overturn a state statute that increased the sentence of a 
person convicted of a felony by five years based on a judicial finding – by preponderance of the 
evidence – that the person “visibly possessed” a firearm.  The Court reasoned that the “visible 
possession” of a firearm portion of the statute was not an element of the crime; rather, it was a 
“sentencing consideration” and did not subject the defendant to a greater penalty than he would 
have been subject to otherwise under the statute. Rehnquist stated that because they “concluded 
that Pennsylvania may properly treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration and not an 
element of any offense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury 
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact.”8 In other words, the 
criminal defendant’s 6th Amendment right was limited to jury determinations of elements of the 
crime, not sentencing considerations, and the distinction between elements of the crime and 
sentencing considerations was a matter of statutory construction.  The only limit McMillan
placed on a sentencing consideration was that it not impose a sentence on a defendant beyond the 
maximum allowed by the underlying charge.
The McMillan decision left open the question whether, upon conviction for first degree 
murder, a person was entitled to a jury determination of any facts that could expose him or her to 
a death sentence.  In Walton v. Arizona (1990),9  the Court considered Arizona’s capital 
sentencing scheme, which called for a judge to determine during the sentencing phase of a first 
degree murder trial the existence of aggravating factors.  If the judge found at least one 
requiring a 12 person jury, the Court moved to explicitly sanction smaller panels.  The minimum jury 
panel in criminal cases is six members (Ballew v. Georgia 435 U.S. 223 [1978]).  In capital cases, 
however, every state uses a 12 member jury. 
7 McMillan v. Pennsylvania 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
8 Id. at 93. 
9 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
5aggravating factor, the defendant was eligible for the death penalty and would avoid that 
sentence only if the judge found sufficient mitigating circumstances to call for leniency. The 
Court upheld this capital sentencing scheme, determining that the factors that led to a death 
sentence were not elements but, rather, sentencing considerations that did not entitle a defendant 
to a jury consideration.  Accordingly, the Court concluded, the sentencing scheme did not violate 
the 6th Amendment.10
Thus, after Walton, it was clear that a defendant’s sentence could be increased up to and 
including death if that sentence was one that fell within the charged crime’s sentencing range 
even if a judge rather than a jury found the facts necessary to increase the sentence, and even if 
the judge found the necessary facts by a standard of proof less rigorous than beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  What was left unanswered by Walton, however, was whether a defendant’s sentence 
could be increased beyond McMillan’s “statutory maximum.”  The Court addressed just such a 
question in Jones v. United States (1999),11 in which the defendant, convicted of a federal 
carjacking statute that carried with it a maximum sentence of fifteen years, was eventually 
sentenced to 25 years after a judicial finding that serious bodily injury had occurred during the 
course of the crime.  On appeal, the Court concluded that the finding of “serious bodily injury” 
was an element of the crime rather than a mere sentencing consideration because, after an 
analysis of similar federal criminal statutes, “Congress probably intended serious bodily injury to 
be an element defining an aggravated form of the crime.”12 Accordingly, Jones stood for the 
proposition that if a defendant’s sentence increased because of statutorily constructed elements 
(as opposed to sentencing considerations), the defendant was entitled to a jury determination 
beyond a reasonable doubt on the facts necessary to support those elements.
10 Id. at 649.
11 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
12 Id. at 236.  
6Although Jones could be seen as a decision favorable to defendants, the extent of the 6th
Amendment right after Jones was somewhat truncated.  A defendant was clearly entitled to a 
jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt on every element that constituted the crime.  The 
Court had carved away that right, however, so that an “element” of the crime did not include –
nor was a defendant entitled to a jury determination thereof – every factor that increased his or 
her sentence.
In a groundbreaking case, the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000),13 opened the door 
to a broader 6th Amendment right than McMillan suggested.  In Apprendi, the defendant was 
charged under state law with criminal possession of a firearm, which carried with it a prison 
sentence of up to ten years.  After pleading guilty, the trial court determined, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that Apprendi violated the state’s hate crime statute.  Apprendi was sentenced to 
twelve years based on this finding – a sentence two years in excess of the statutory maximum.  
On appeal, the state defended Apprendi’s sentence, arguing that the state hate crime statute was 
merely a permissible “sentence enhancement” similar to the enhancement upheld in McMillan.  
The Court disagreed, noting that “[a]s a matter of simple justice, it seems obvious that the 
procedural safeguards designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted pains should apply 
equally to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for punishment.  Merely using the label 
‘sentence enhancement’ to describe the latter surely does not provide a principled basis for 
treating them differently.”14  The Court noted that Apprendi was “indisputably” entitled to “a 
jury determination that he is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”15 And then, as if to reiterate the point, the Court stated that 
“[e]qually well founded is the companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a 
13 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
14 Id. at 476.  
15 Id. at 477 (internal quotations omitted).  
7reasonable doubt.”16  The Court went on to trace the history of criminal jury trials and admitted 
that it “coined” the term “sentencing factor” in its McMillan decision, creating a species of 
criminal law facts that were not determined by a jury but could nevertheless “affect the sentence 
imposed by the judge.”17 The Court concluded that based on its own decisions and the history of 
criminal law in the United States “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”18  “It is unconstitutional for a legislature to 
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed.  It is equally clear that such facts must be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”19
The Court seemed untroubled that its ruling could be considered overruling Walton, in 
which the defendant’s sentence was set at life in prison and, but for the trial court’s factual 
findings, could not be increased to a sentence of death.  The Court rejected such a concern, 
stating that “once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense for 
which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide 
whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.”20  The Court, 
with Apprendi, expanded the right to a jury trial but carved out an exception for capital cases in 
which judges could determine the facts necessary to impose a sentence of death.
16 Id. at 478.    
17 Id. at 485.  
18 Id. at 490.  The “other than the fact of a prior conviction” language in the Apprendi holding evolved out 
of Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224 (1998), in which the Court was not troubled by a judicial 
finding that increased a sentence beyond the statutory maximum when the increase was based on prior 




 Id. at 497.
8It took only two years for the Court to overturn that exception, however. In Ring v. 
Arizona (2002),21  the Court again considered the Arizona capital sentencing scheme it had 
previously upheld in Walton:  “Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we 
conclude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an 
increase in their maximum punishment.”22 Contrasting its holding in Apprendi, the Court stated 
that “[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly 
diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two 
years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.”23 The Court held that “to the extent 
[a capital sentencing scheme] allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty,” that scheme is 
unconstitutional.24
For our purposes here, Ring marks the state-of-the-art in the Court’s 6th Amendment 
jurisprudence as it concerns capital defendants.  But two recent decisions show how the Court is 
continuing to expand the right to a jury in non-capital cases.  In Blakeley v. Washington (2004),25
the Court considered the meaning of “statutory maximum” as it applies to 6th Amendment 
jurisprudence.  At issue was a state law that allowed a sentencing judge to depart from the 
standard sentencing range if the judge found the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.”  The 
Court held that “the “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant . . . .  In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum a sentence 
a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
21 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
22 Ring, at 589.   
23 Id. at 609.  
24 Id. 609.
25 Blakeley v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, ___ U.S. __ (2004).
9additional finding.”26  The Court’s opinion was not remarkable because it broke with the 
Apprendi ruling – it decidedly did not – but because it called into question the federal sentencing 
guidelines, which look a lot like the state sentencing scheme overturned by the Court.  And, as if 
on cue, the Court examined the federal sentencing guidelines in United States v. Booker (2005).27
In Booker, the Court fell short of invalidating the federal sentencing guidelines but did confirm 
that the guidelines were also subject to the requirements of the 6th Amendment as stated in 
Apprendi.  The Blakely and Booker decisions merely confirm that the Court is intent on 
expanding the right to a jury trial.
This brief overview of the Court’s recent 6th Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates that 
the right to a jury trial has expanded considerably since In re Winship.  As it stands now, the 
right to a jury trial means, at least, that:
• the defendant is entitled to a jury determination of each and every element of the 
crime
• the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt about each and every 
element
• despite a flirtation with “sentencing considerations,” any fact that increases a 
defendant’s sentence must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and
• capital defendants, no less than other criminal defendants, are entitled to all the 
protections of the 6th Amendment.
This expansion in the meaning of the 6th Amendment is encouraging for proponents of 
robust defendant rights.  It removes from the hands of the government – in this case judges –
26 Id. at ___ (italics in original).  
27 United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ U.S. ___ (2005)
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factual determinations that can determine the fate of the criminal defendant.  But for any right to 
be meaningful, it must be accompanied by corresponding obligations that are fulfilled by 
appropriate actors.  For the capital defendant to have a meaningful right to a jury trial, it is 
incumbent upon the legal system to ensure that, among other things, the jury is adequately 
informed of the appropriate law and that there are adequate safeguards in place to ensure that a 
misinformed jury is properly corrected, and that the selected jury is free from bias or prejudice.
Juror Misunderstanding
It would seem that in matters as weighty as capital jury deliberations, the Court would 
vigorously strive to ensure that jurors understand their instructions – instructions that are 
complex and replete with legalese.  Knowing what we know about jurors (especially capital 
jurors) and the instructions they are required to follow, the criminal justice system should 
demonstrate both an awareness that jurors frequently will not understand those instructions (for 
example, Foglia 2003) and a willingness to redress problems of misunderstanding as they arise.
Instead, the law in this area is based on a presumption that jurors understand and follow 
their instructions.28 As the Court emphatically stated, “we adhere to the crucial assumption 
underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions.”29
Of course, a weak presumption (or assumption30) that jurors understand their instructions would
serve this purpose well.  Capital trials would operate effectively if it were assumed that jurors 
understand and follow their instructions absent evidence to the contrary.  But it does not work
that way.  Rather, the presumption that jurors understand their instructions is used to buttress 
against attacks on death sentences and other criminal convictions.  The blind allegiance to the 
28 See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).  
29 Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 (1985).
30 See Ritter (2004) for an interesting discussion regarding the linguistic distinction between assumption
and presumption¸ terms that are often used interchangeably in court opinions and the literature. 
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presumption that jurors understand their instructions is so overwhelming that it has morphed 
nearly into a standard whereby appellate courts look the other way despite overwhelming 
evidence that jurors fail to comprehend their instructions.
As a threshold matter, it would seem that if a defendant raises the possibility that the jury 
instructions are subject to competing interpretations, one of which would result in 
unconstitutional considerations, a reviewing court should first look at the instruction itself for the 
claimed ambiguity.  If the instruction is subject to at least one unconstitutional interpretation, it is 
probably not possible to determine whether the jury applied the correct interpretation – after all, 
appellate judges cannot step inside the minds of jurors.  Instead, following a developing line of 
argument first introduced in dissent then later marshaled for the majority, Rehnquist has 
successfully advanced the notion that the possibility of unconstitutional interpretation need not 
impinge on the Court's confidence in producing a just verdict.
Thus, even when the jury questions a judge on an ambiguous instruction and receives an 
ambiguous response, that jury is, in the words of Rehnquist, "presumed both to follow its 
instructions and to understand a judge’s answer to its question.”31 As Scalia admits, the
presumption is closer to an article of faith than a demonstrable truth: "The rule that juries are 
presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that 
the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation 
of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.”32
But does available evidence support the position that jurors understand and follow their 
instructions? It does not.
31 Weeks v. Angelone 528 U.S. 225, 226 (2000).
32 Richardson v. Marsh 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
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The list of studies demonstrating the inability of typical citizens to process, much less 
faithfully act upon, jury instructions is capacious (See, for example, Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor, and 
Strawn 1978; Charrow and Charrow 1979; Costanzo and Constanzo 1994; Diamond and Levi 1996; 
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini 1982; Steele and Thornburg 1988; Strawn and Buchanan 1976; Wiener, Hurt, 
Thomas, Sadler, Baker, and Sargent 1998). 
When Steele and Thornburg (1988) provided common juror instructions and then asked 
their jury eligible subjects to paraphrase the applicable law 13% did so correctly. When Strawn 
and Buchanan (1976) provided subjects juror instructions before administering a true/false test 
based on the law, subjects missed almost a third of the questions, barely better than a comparison 
group given no instructions at all before taking the test. When Foglia (2003) interviewed former 
capital case jurors, every single one made an error in explaining their legal duty. 
As some jurists have indeed admitted, juror instructions “for the most part are a poor 
vehicle for communicating with jurors,” because while they are legally accurate their 
effectiveness tends “to be outweighed by the resulting obstacles to juror 
comprehension”(Schwarzer 1981, 739).
Social science evidence suggests that misunderstood instructions do not merely confuse 
juries, they tend to tilt the process in the prosecution's favor. As Hurt (2000) found, the less 
understanding a person has of the capital sentencing instructions they have been given, the more 
likely they are to support a death sentence . Lynch (1997; Lynch and Haney 2000) has also found 
that those who displayed a poor understanding of instructions were more likely to allow personal 
racial prejudice to influence their sentencing preference. 
While any legal process built upon a foundation of misunderstanding is intolerable, both 
legally and logically, the weakness of juror instructions is also a logistical impediment to the 
functioning of our courts. As Liebman, Fagan, and West (2000) found in their comprehensive 
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study of the legal fates of capital defendants, fully 20% of death sentence reversals are based on 
unconstitutional jury instructions.
Two areas of capital sentencing instructions that have proved particularly fertile for 
producing challenges based on potential juror misunderstanding are mitigation instructions and 
definition of sentence instructions.
Mitigation
When a divided Court permitted the re-implementation of the death penalty in Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976),33 only four years after a similarly divided Court had effectively suspended the 
death penalty in Furman v. Georgia,34 justices sought to establish boundaries for its use. The 
death penalty, the Court ruled, may only be imposed if it is "directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."35
In Gregg, and a series of subsequent cases, the Court established the value of a bifurcated 
trial process.  Typically, a single jury in a capital case would, in effect, sit through two trials, 
deliberate twice, and reach two verdicts.  In the first, as in any non-capital trial,  the jury would 
hear evidence and render a verdict on guilt.  If the defendant was found guilty of a capital crime, 
the jury then would hear evidence relating to the nature of the crime and the nature of the 
defendant and render a verdict on the appropriate sentence.
In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution seeks to establish aggravating 
evidence – typically relating to the heinousness of the crime and the depravity of the defendant.  
The defense is entitled to rebut those claims, and is also entitled to introduce evidence relating to 
any aspect of the defendant's character or background that might mitigate the defendant's actions 
33 Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34 Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
35 Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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and suggest a sentence short of death.36  The Court has ruled that mitigating evidence is not 
subject to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, and can result in a verdict rejecting the death 
sentence based on juror agreement that mitigation exists, even if jurors do not unanimously agree 
on specific mitigating factors.37
Despite the gravity of a death sentence deliberation, and the centrality of weighing 
aggravating and mitigating evidence to that process, numerous academic studies suggest jurors 
are ill-equipped or disinclined to adequately consider mitigating evidence (Blankenship, 
Luginbuhl, Cullen, and Redick 1997; Luginbuhl 1992; Wiener et al 2004).  In short, many jurors do 
not understand the instructions they are given by the courts that are supposed to guide their 
deliberations and verdict.  The consequences of misunderstanding are considerable. “If the jury 
does not understand how the law requires it to establish, weigh, and balance aggravation and 
mitigation," Wiener and colleagues argue, "then it may well be requiring the defendant to forfeit 
his or her life without the benefit of due process of law” (Wiener et al 2004, 570).
Frank and Applegate(1998) used members of the jury pool in Columbus, Ohio who were 
awaiting assignment to a case to test juror understanding of the death sentencing and deliberation 
process. The researchers showed those jurors a video summarizing a capital case, followed by 
the actual instructions read by a judge. After a period of deliberation, jurors were given a 
multiple choice test to measure their understanding of their duties. The questions most frequently 
answered incorrectly involved the concept of mitigation. The questions most frequently 
answered correctly involved the concept of aggravation.
36 Jurek v. Texas 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
37 Mills v. Maryland 486 US 367 (1988).
15
Wiener, Pritchard, and Weston (1995) used a similar method with jury eligible citizens in 
the St. Louis area. After supplying the typical instructions offered by Missouri courts in capital 
cases they found only a 50% rate of understanding for mitigation concepts.
When Haney and Lynch  (1994) provided California juror instructions to a college 
student sample, they also found fewer than half could explain mitigation. More alarmingly, one-
fourth of the subjects thought a mitigating factor (such as mental illness) was a basis for 
supporting a death sentence.38
While these studies employ a variety of proxy groups to substitute for actual deliberating 
capital juries, there is little doubt the patterns unearthed apply in the jury room.  Indeed, surveys 
of former capital jurors confirm confusion regarding mitigating factors and a willingness to see 
mitigating evidence as irrelevant (Haney, Sontag, and Costanzo 1994). This is how one capital 
juror summed up the mitigating evidence presented in the sentencing proceeding: "It was 
interesting, but it had no bearing on the case…his whole life boils down to this once incident"
(Haney, Sontag, and Costanzo 1994, 167).39
38
 The potential for twisting mitigating evidence into aggravating evidence is not merely theoretical.  As 
O'Connor noted in Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551, 603 (2005): "the prosecutor’s apparent attempt to use 
respondent’s youth as an aggravating circumstance in this case is troubling." (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
39
 In Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005), the Court acknowledged the tenuous hold mitigating 
evidence (for example, immaturity) maintains on the jury's attention: "An unacceptable likelihood exists 
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments 
based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, 
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death." Scalia 
disapprovingly extended the Court's conclusion; that is, if juries are unable to process mitigating evidence 
regarding immaturity why would they be thought capable of applying any other mitigating information. 
Scalia wrote, "Nor does the Court suggest a stopping point for its reasoning. If juries cannot make 
appropriate determinations in cases involving murderers under 18, in what other kinds of cases will the
Court find jurors deficient? We have already held that no jury may consider whether a mentally deficient 
defendant can receive the death penalty, irrespective of his crime. Why not take other mitigating factors, 
such as considerations of childhood abuse or poverty, away from juries as well? Surely jurors 
'overpower[ed]' by 'the brutality or cold-blooded nature' of a crime could not adequately weigh these 
mitigating factors either." (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Beyond discounting mitigating evidence, research suggests the application and weighing 
of mitigating factors can be dependent on personal biases. Edelman (2004), who also surveyed 
former capital jurors, found that contrary to the laws and their sworn duty, jurors were less apt to 
value mitigating evidence if they felt empathy for the victim. Empathy, in turn, was affected by 
factors including the race of the victim. 
As Wiener and his coauthors (2004) summarize the situation, given that “existing 
literature converges on a serious challenge to the assumption that reasonable individuals 
understand jury instructions,” therefore, "courts should be cautious in concluding that reasonable 
people understand mitigation and aggravation as presented in pattern instructions (Wiener et al 
2004, 531).”  In fact, Luginbuhl and Burkhead (2004) argue that contrary to all applicable laws, 
the typical juror enters the sentencing proceeding with a "presumption of death." Instead of 
alleviating that legal misconception, court instructions often exacerbate it by leaving jurors 
confused.  To wit, numerous studies have found a strong positive relationship between 
misunderstanding the instructions and willingness to impose a death sentence (Frank and 
Applegate 1998; Wiener, Pritchard, and Weston 1995 ; Wiener et al 2004).
Of course, the significance of juror understanding of capital instructions and the nature of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is only amplified by the expansion of the jurors' role in 
capital sentencing. Indeed, as Wiener and colleagues point out: “The logic followed in Ring
highlights the importance that the Court assigns to the way in which judges and jurors use 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to reach penalty decisions” (Wiener et al 2004, 572).
Given the increasing centrality of jurors in the capital sentencing process, and the strong 
academic evidence of juror confusion regarding sentencing generally and mitigation specifically, 
it is not surprising that a number of cases have advanced to the Supreme Court for review 
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hinging on the role and definition of mitigation. Notably, in each of these mitigation disputes 
(Franklin v. Lynaugh 198840; Buchanan v. Angelone 199841; Boyde v. California 199042; Weeks 
v. Angelone 200043; and in one aggravation case Francis v. Franklin 198544) Rehnquist found 
himself advancing an argument that pertinent instructions need not be clarified, amplified, 
defined, or sometimes even mentioned.  In the four cases Scalia participated in, and in the two 
Thomas took part, they shared Rehnquist's conclusion. More to the point, over time the 
conservatives’ perspective on capital jury instructions has become the Court’s perspective.
The capital prosecution of Raymond Franklin hinged on intent (Francis v. Franklin
1985).  To win a jury verdict of malice murder in Georgia, and to ultimately pursue a death 
sentence, prosecutors had to prove Franklin intended to kill his victim.
Franklin was imprisoned for a non-capital offense when he was taken, shackled and 
guarded, to a civilian dentist. Temporarily unshackled while in the dentist's office, Franklin was 
able to take an officer's gun and alight with a hostage from the dental office.  Franklin made 
several unsuccessful efforts to steal a car.  After being unable to get inside the dentist's car, 
Franklin, still holding his hostage, demanded car keys from scattered passersby.  One person said 
he didn't have a car, another refused to part with his keys. Franklin and the hostage walked to a 
nearby home where Franklin knocked on the door and demanded the resident's car keys.  The 
resident slammed the door. Franklin fired the gun twice. Both shots went through the door, the 
first killed the homeowner, the second lodged in the home's ceiling. Franklin continued 
unsuccessfully to seek a car before giving up, and releasing the hostage.
40 Franklin v. Lynaugh 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
41 Buchanan v. Angelone 522 U.S. 269 (1998). 
42 Boyde v. California 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
43 Weeks v. Angelone 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
44 Francis v. Franklin 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
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Franklin’s entire defense was lack of intent.  He claimed the shooting was not intentional. 
He pointed to the fact that none of the people he encountered on the street were harmed, and his 
hostage was unharmed. The fact that the second shot went into the ceiling, the defense claimed, 
showed that Franklin was not attempting to kill the victim.
The aggravation instructions given the jury addressed the issue of intent: “The acts of a 
person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be a product of the person’s will, but the 
presumption my be rebutted.  A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the 
natural and probable consequences of his acts but the presumption may be rebutted.”45
One hour into their guilt phase deliberations the jury asked for further instructions on the 
issue of intent and the definition of accident. After hearing the original instructions repeated the 
jury deliberated for ten additional minutes before returning a guilty verdict. Franklin was 
sentenced to death the next day.
Petitioning the Court, Franklin's attorneys argued that the jury instructions inverted the 
burden of proof.  That is, the aggravation instructions suggested that intent could be assumed, 
leaving upon the defense the burden of rebuttal. The state argued that the instructions clearly 
placed the burden of proof on the prosecution.
Writing for a 5 to 4 majority, Brennan found that the instruction on intent “violate[d] the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”46 The instruction created a “mandatory presumption” where proving 
the act (firing the gun) in effect established the intent and that “a reasonable juror” would 
45
 Id. at 309.
46
 Id. at 319.
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understand the instructions to shift “to the respondent the burden of persuasion on the element of 
intent once the State had proved the predicate acts.”47
The Court emphasized the phrase "may be rebutted" implied that it was the defendant's 
burden to establish that an intent "inference was unwarranted."48  Separately, the instructions did 
note that “criminal intention may not be presumed.”49  But Brennan concluded that the language 
"merely contradicts" but does not "absolve" the instruction's infirmity.50 Indeed, he noted, "a 
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors 
applied in reaching their verdicts.”51
Rehnquist's dissent was incredulous. “Today the Court sets aside Franklin’s murder 
conviction…because this Court concludes that one or two sentences out of several pages of 
instructions given by the judge" lowered the state's burden of proof.52 Indeed, later in his dissent 
Rehnquist explicitly stated: “due process is not violated in every case where an isolated sentence 
implicates constitutional problems.”53 To Rehnquist, it would appear, the standard for an 
unconstitutional instruction must demonstrate it to be not only unconstitutional but verbose. 
In fact, Rehnquist conceded that a "technical analysis of the charge…from a legal 
standpoint" would support the Court's conclusion that the instructions were misleading.54
However, no “reasonable juror” could have read the instructions closely enough to form the 
47
 Id. at 316.
48
 Id. at 318.
49
 Id. at 320.
50
 Id. at 322.
51
 Id. at 322.
52
 Id. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
53
 Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54
 Id. at 340 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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misimpression the Court posits.55 Indeed, Rehnquist suggested "the Court is attributing qualities 
to the average juror that are found in very few lawyers."56
Instead of burdening the defense with disproving intent, Rehnquist concluded the typical 
juror would have approached the situation far differently. Rehnquist wrote: “The reasonable 
interpretation of the challenged charge is that…the presumption could be rebutted by the 
circumstances surrounding the acts, whether presented by the State or the defendant”.57 In
other words, Rehnquist did not find the burden of disproving intent to be placed on the defense 
because at any given moment the prosecution could switch sides and attempt to present a case 
disproving intent.  
While in the minority in this case, Rehnquist's underlying conclusion, that the Court must 
raise the bar for defendants to demonstrate faulty instructions, would ultimately take hold and be 
applied in mitigation instruction cases.  As he suggested in dissent, “it must at least be likely” 
rather than a reasonable possibility that instructions led jurors to misapply the law before the 
Court should intervene.58
As Brennan noted, such a standard would leave the Court an "impressionistic and 
intuitive" task to deign what path jurors followed in cases such as Francis v. Franklin when the 
55
 Id. at 332 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
56
 Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Brennan took suspicious note of Rehnquist's conclusion that 
jurors would not have paid enough attention to the instructions to be affected by the contradiction.  In a 
previous case [Parker v. Randolph 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979)] in which the prosecution's argument hinged
on close juror attention to the instructions, Rehnquist was burdened by no doubts regarding juror rigor. 
Rehnquist wrote for the Court, “A crucial assumption underlying [trial by jury] is that juries will follow 
the instructions given them by the trial judge.  Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to 
instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the 
jury was improperly instructed.” Thus, Brennan chides, “Apparently [Rehnquist] would have the degree 
of attention a juror is presumed to pay to particular jury instructions vary with whether a presumption of 
attentiveness would help or harm the criminal defendant.” [Francis v. Franklin 471 U.S. 307,  324 n.9 
(1985)].
57 Francis v. Franklin 471 U.S. 307,  341 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
58
 Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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instructions contained a contradiction.59 This despite what Brennan called a settled precedent60
that verdicts must be set aside when there is a reasonable possibility that jurors based their 
verdict on an unconstitutional understanding of law.
 In a Texas capital case, Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988),61 the sentencing jury was instructed 
to return a death sentence if they found two specific aggravating factors (that the murder was 
deliberate and that the defendant represented a continuing threat).  The instructions made no 
mention of the concept of mitigation.
The defense asked for modifications to the instruction to explain the use of mitigation. 
Specifically the defense asked that the jury be told (1) to apply any mitigating evidence found 
when deciding upon the aggravating factors, and that (2) even if they answered the aggravating 
factors affirmatively they could still use mitigation findings to support a vote for a life term. The 
judge declined the defense's request.
The issue before the Court was whether the instructions afforded the defendant an 
adequate opportunity to have mitigating evidence weighed by the jury in its sentencing 
deliberations.  In a decision written by White, and joined by Rehnquist and Scalia, a plurality of 
the Court found the instructions adequate. 
White noted that the judge's instructions told the jury to base their verdict "on all the 
evidence."62 Thus, even though mitigation was never mentioned, that general instruction carried 
with it the obligation to weigh mitigating evidence.
The entirety of the defense's mitigation presentation was Franklin's prison record, a 
record which revealed him not to be a violent inmate. "We are thus quite sure that the jury’s 
59
 Id. at 324 n.8.
60 Stromberg v. California 283 U.S. 359 (1931).  
61 Franklin v. Lynaugh 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
62
 Id. at 170.
22
consideration of petitioner’s prison record was not improperly limited,”63 White wrote, because 
the jury was “free to weigh and evaluate”64 that record.
In reality, though, the standard advanced by White and the plurality was not based on any 
demonstrable indication that the jury did weigh the mitigating evidence, but rather by their 
conclusion that weighing such evidence was possible. “We do not believe that the jury 
instructions or the Texas Special Issues precluded jury consideration of any relevant mitigating 
circumstances in this case," White wrote.65
Given the Texas instructions, Stevens’ dissent questioned how a defendant, with a clearly 
established right to present mitigating evidence reflecting upon any factor relevant to his life, 
could possibly have that evidence be properly weighed when the jury entered deliberations with 
only two questions before them (Was the murder deliberate?; and Is the defendant a continuing 
threat?).  “A sentencing jury must be given the authority to reject imposition of the death penalty 
on the basis of any evidence relevant to the defendant's character or record or the circumstances 
of the offense proffered by the defendant in support of a sentence less than death. That rule does 
not merely require that the jury be allowed to hear any such evidence the defendant desires to 
introduce, it also requires that the jury be allowed to give 'independent mitigating weight' to the 
evidence.”66
Stevens argued that by not offering an instruction on the application of mitigation, the 
judge had, in effect, told the jury to ignore such evidence. "The failure to give such an instruction 
removed that evidence from the sentencer's consideration just as effectively as would have an 
instruction informing the jury that petitioner's character was irrelevant to its sentencing 
63
 Id. at 179.
64
 Id. at 178.
65
 Id. at 183.
66
 Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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decision.”67  In fact, in her concurring opinion, O'Connor admitted that the implied legal 
relevance of mitigation seems limited only to direct responses to the aggravating factors.68
Ten years later the Court considered a very similar case.  In Buchanan v. Angelone
(1998),69 a Virginia judge presented capital sentencing instructions to the jury without mention 
of mitigation. Instead, the judge instructed the jury to weigh whether the crime was 
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."70 If they agreed it was, the jury would then 
deliberate on whether a death sentence was appropriate. Again, the judge instructed jurors to 
consider "all the evidence."71
As in Franklin v. Lynaugh, the defense unsuccessfully sought a set of instructions 
explaining mitigation. Specifically, the defense sought to provide jurors with a list of mitigating 
factors such as Buchanan's age, impaired capacity, and lack of previous violent offenses. Further 
the defense asked that jurors be instructed that if they found the factor to mitigate against the 
death penalty then "you shall consider that fact in deciding whether to impose a sentence of 
death or life imprisonment.”72
In a 6 to 3 decision, the Court again found that the lack of instructions on the concept of 
mitigation and mitigating factors does not violate due process or cruel and unusual punishment. 
Writing for the Court, Rehnquist emphasized that while any death sentence deliberation 
must be a "broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence,"73 there is no "particular way"74
juries should consider such evidence.
67
 Id. at 192, 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 Franklin v. Lynaugh 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
69 Buchanan v. Angelone 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
70 Id. at 273 n.1.
71
 Id. at 272.
72
 Id. at 273.
73
 Id. at 276.
74
 Id. at 276.
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As did the Franklin v. Lynaugh  plurality, Rehnquist here noted that the jury was told to 
"base its decision on ‘all the evidence,’" thus affording "jurors an opportunity to consider 
mitigating evidence.”75
That the jury gave weight to mitigating evidence is demonstrated, Rehnquist argued, by 
dint of the amount of mitigating evidence they were presented. That is, because they jury heard 
two days of testimony on defendant’s background and mental problems, “it is not likely that the 
jury would disregard this extensive testimony in making its decision, particularly given the 
instruction to consider 'all the evidence.'”76 [Of course, Rehnquist came to the same conclusion 
when the jury was presented almost no mitigating evidence in Franklin v. Lynaugh]. 
One fundamental fact here and in related cases is that the Court’s certainty regarding 
juror understanding relies on no direct evidence. That is, no one bothered to ask the jurors if they 
understood the instructions.  No one bothered to find out if the mitigating evidence was properly 
considered. No one bothered to test these instructions to see if ordinary laypersons could 
understand them.  
Meanwhile, in a concurring opinion, Scalia agreed that juror instructions need not explain 
mitigation.  He offered this conclusion not because the relevance of mitigation is obvious in its 
presentation, or established inside the phrase "all the evidence," but rather because juries need 
not "be given discretion to consider mitigating evidence."77 Indeed, Scalia found fault not only 
with mitigation, but with the entire bifurcated process. “[D]rawing an arbitrary line in the sand 
between the 'eligibility and selection phases' of the sentencing decision is, in my view, 
incoherent and ultimately doomed to failure.”78
75
 Id. at 277.
76
 Id. at 278.
77
 Id. at 279 (Scalia, J, concurring).
78
 Id. at 279 (Scalia, J, concurring).
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Writing in dissent, Breyer questioned how jurors were to operationalize the mitigating 
evidence.  As in Franklin v. Lynaugh, Breyer argued that since the only question put to jurors 
involved aggravating circumstances, jurors would reasonably apply mitigating information only 
to the extent it directly helped them decide upon the aggravating evidence.  "Without more – and 
there was no more – is to tell the jury that evidence of mitigating circumstances (concerning, say, 
the defendant's childhood and his troubled relationships with the victims) is not relevant to their 
sentencing decision.”79
Unless the jury was "made up of experienced death penalty lawyers …parsing the 
instructions in a highly complicated, technical way that they alone are likely to understand" then 
"a natural reading of the language" would seem to foreclose the application of mitigation.80
Breyer made a rather simple suggestion for changing the instructions: “mention of 
mitigating evidence anywhere in the instructions” would clear things up.81
In directly competing interpretations, Rehnquist and Breyer attempt to show how each 
other’s conclusion is a “strained parsing”82 of the instruction.  They debate, among other matters, 
the relative weight of the instruction’s use of the words “if” and “or.”83 An amusing – at least it 
79
 Id. at 282 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80
 Id. at 283 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 283 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82
 Id. at XX.
83
 Breyer wrote in dissent that the third paragraph of juror instructions, what he labeled the “key 
paragraph,” provided “if the jury finds that the Commonwealth has proved death eligibility, the jury ‘may 
fix the punishment … at death.’ It immediately adds in the same sentence ‘or if you believe from all the 
evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment . . . at life 
imprisonment.’ It is the stringing together of these two phrases, along with the use of the connective ‘or,’ 
that leads to a potential understanding of the paragraph as saying, ‘If you find the defendant eligible for 
death, you may impose the death penalty, but if you find (on the basis of ‘all the evidence’) that death 
penalty is not ‘justified,’ which is to say that the defendant is not eligible for the death penalty, then you 
must impose life imprisonment.’ Without any further explanation, the jury might well believe that 
whether death is, or is not, ‘justified’ turns on the presence or absence of...aggravating circumstances of 
the crime–not upon the defendant’s mitigating evidence about his upbringing and other factors.  [Id. at 
XX (Breyer, J., dissenting)]. Rehnquist replied, “The dissent suggests that the disjunctive ‘or’ clauses in 
the third paragraph may lead the jury to think that it can only impose life imprisonment if it does not find 
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would be if a person’s life did not hang in the balance – colloquy between two jurists quibbling 
over language.  What the exchange proves, however, is that one judge with the aid of a team of 
law clerks does not interpret a jury instruction the same way another justice – with his own team 
of law clerks – does.  If justices on the Court cannot agree on an interpretation, how can lay 
persons with no legal training be presumed to do so?
California's capital instructions in place at the time Richard Boyde was tried did mention 
mitigation (Boyde v. California 199084). The instructions featured 11 factors – lettered a through 
k – the jury should consider before deciding upon a sentence. The first 8 factors essentially 
established possible aggravating circumstances. The 9th and 10th factors established two specific 
forms of mitigating circumstances, neither of which applied to Boyde. The 11th – factor k – as it 
was referred to – instructed the jury to consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”85 After deciding upon the 
factors, the jury was told to determine if  the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigation, 
and if so, then “you shall impose a sentence of death.” 86
The issue before the Court was whether the wording of the mitigation instruction 
narrowly focused the jury's attention on the crime, thus undermining the value of the mitigation 
evidence regarding Boyde's personal background and troubled childhood that was the focus of 
his defense. Boyde also argued that the “shall impose” language created a limit on juror 
discretion to support a life sentence regardless of the aggravation/mitigation equation.
the aggravator proved. But this interpretation is at odds with the ordinary meaning of the instruction’s 
language and structure. ...The third paragraph states that ‘if’ the aggravator is proved, the jury may choose 
between death and life.  The fourth paragraph states that ‘if’ the aggravator is not proved, the jury must 
impose life. The ‘if’ clauses clearly condition the choices that follow. And since the fourth paragraph tells 
the jury what to do if the aggravator is not proved, the third paragraph clearly involves only the jury's task 
if the aggravator is proved” (Id. at XX).
84 Boyde v. California 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
85 Id. at 374.
86
 Id. at 374.
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In a 5 to 4 decision written by Rehnquist and joined by Scalia the Court upheld the 
instructions.
Rehnquist admitted the instructions could be considered "ambiguous."87 But as was the 
case in Buchanan v. Angelone (1998), he argued that surely the presentation of mitigating 
evidence implied its relevance.88 Further the jury was free to consider any information and 
decide that it somehow applied “to the crime.”
Thus, Rehnquist concluded that the jury's interpretation of the instructions as limiting 
their attention to information directly relevant to the crime was "only a possibility."89  Instead, 
building on his dissent in Francis v. Franklin (1985), Rehnquist argued that the Court need be 
concerned about instructions only when there is a “reasonable likelihood”90 that the jury as a 
whole applied instructions as the defendant asserted.  "Finality and accuracy," Rehnquist wrote, 
are better established by a focus on the likely conclusions of the entire jury rather than 
considering "how a single hypothetical ‘reasonable juror’ could or might have interpreted the 
instruction.”91
This evolving standard for juror confusion continues to have tremendous implications.  In 
previous cases, including Francis v. Franklin, the Court concerned itself with instructions that "a 
reasonable juror"92 could rely upon to impose an unconstitutional judgment.  Here the Court 
87
 Id. at 380.
88
 Rehnquist wrote: “Even were the language of the instruction less clear than we think, the context of the 
proceedings would have led reasonable jurors to believe that evidence of petitioner’s background and 
character could be considered in mitigation.” Id. at 383.
89
 Id. at 380.
90
 Id. at 380.
91
 Id. at 380.
92 Francis v. Franklin 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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applies a standard requiring that instructions create a "likelihood that the jury"93 has applied an 
unconstitutional standard. 
Beyond dismissing the significance of objections to instructions which are potentially 
misleading, the Court here moved to dismiss objections to instructions which have misled jurors 
(providing that some unspecified ratio of jurors was not misled). As Marshall noted in dissent, 
"the majority regards confidence" that individual jurors understood the instructions "as 
unnecessary to its affirmance of Boyde’s death sentence."94  Such a stance, Marshall argued, 
"reflects the Court’s growing and unjustified hostility to claims of constitutional violation by 
capital defendants."95
Apart from arguing that some jurors acting based on an unconstitutional standard is 
acceptable, Rehnquist set the Court down the very difficult path of determining precisely what 
percentage of a jury was misled by an instruction.  How that is to be determined is not spelled 
out.  Ironically, given he's created a standard based on guesswork, Rehnquist then mocked the 
defense claim of juror confusion because it "amounts to no more than speculation."96
Part of the distinction Rehnquist made between juror confusion and jury confusion was 
based on the conclusion that the deliberation process allows juries to rise above confusing 
instructions because the group will ultimately arrive at a “commonsense understanding of the 
instructions.”97 By contrast, academic research shows the deliberation process is by no means a 
93 Boyde v. California 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (emphasis added).
94
 Id. at 406 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95
 Id. at 406 (Marshall, J, dissenting).
96 Id. at 380. But, as was made clear in his interpretation of juror tears in Weeks v. Angelone, divining the 
thoughts of jurors in their secret deliberations is something of a specialty for Rehnquist and his fellow 
conservatives
97
 Rehnquist wrote: “Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of 
meaning in the same way that lawyers might.  Differences among them in interpretation of instructions 
may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in 
the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.” Id. at 380-81.
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place where misconceptions go to die, but rather a forum where preconceived notions and faulty 
instructions can wreak havoc with legal process (Wiener et al 2004).
Indeed, Rehnquist cited no evidence that would suggest “commonsense” understandings 
will prevail; more importantly, he fails to mention exactly what a commonsense understanding of 
the instructions might look like.  As is readily apparent from the instruction, the language, 
syntax, and structure are not what lay persons generally encounter, so it is hard to understand 
how they might have come to a “commonsense” interpretation.
In dissent, Marshall lamented the lowering of the bar for instructions (or the raising of the 
bar for challenges to them).  Indeed, Marshall suggested the Court had created an ambiguous 
standard in reviewing ambiguous instructions, which can only result in "confusion."98
Given that the only relevant mitigation instruction “unambiguously refers to 
circumstances related to the crime” 99 Marshall questioned how the majority could be convinced 
the jury gave weight to mitigating evidence that was outside "the plain meaning of the factor’s 
language.”100  People do not view “the seriousness of a crime as dependent upon the background 
and character of the offender.  A typical juror would not, for example, describe a particular 
murder as 'a less serious crime' because of the redeeming qualities of the murderer.”101
For Marshall, "when we tolerate the possibility of error in capital proceedings and leave 
people in doubt," we step toward the death penalty process the Court had found "discriminatory" 
and "intolerable" in Furman v. Georgia.102
Instead of the obvious course of action – confronting head-on the ambiguity of the 
instructions and conceding that a layperson could easily produce an unconstitutional application 
98 Boyde v. California 494 U.S. 370, 395 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99
 Id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
100
 Id. at 398 (Marshall, J., dissenting)..
101
 Id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting)..
102
 Id. at 406 (Marshall, J., dissenting)..
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of those instructions, Rehnquist chose to instead speculate about whether it was likely that the 
jury interpreted the instructions unconstitutionally.  This does not seem to be a jurisprudence 
aimed at ensuring a meaningful right to a jury but, rather, a jurisprudence of protecting the legal 
system from legitimate questions.  And, as the dissent noted, “It is an essential corollary of our 
reasonable-doubt standard in criminal proceedings that a conviction, capital or otherwise, cannot 
stand if the jury’s verdict could have rested on unconstitutional grounds.”103
The fact that Rehnquist, in establishing the “reasonable likelihood” standard, is more 
worried about protecting the system against attack rather than supporting a meaningful right to a 
jury is confirmed when he wrote about two “strong policies” of the Court, one in favor of 
“accurate determination of the appropriate sentence in a capital case” and the other, which he 
wrote is “equally strong”, “against retrials years after the first trial where the claimed error 
amounts to no more than speculation.”104  Rehnquist’s commentary on the Court’s two “equally 
strong” policies begs the question:  when the two policies conflict, which one wins?  Rehnquist 
here elevated getting it over with over ensuring that the capital defendant receives a meaningful 
right to a jury trial.
Despite the Court's support for its instructions, state legislators in California ultimately 
rewrote the mitigation language in their statute. Beyond the original language of factor k 
referring to “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is 
not a legal excuse for the crime,” the new instructions included the requirement that jurors note  
“any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record… whether or not related 
to the offense for which he is on trial.”
103 Id. at 389 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
104
 Id. at 380
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In many respects a perfect culmination of this line of controversy occurred in Weeks v. 
Angelone (2000).105  Again the issue centered on how mitigation was to be considered. On  this 
occasion, however, there is no need to speculate on whether "a reasonable juror" was confused, 
or if there was a "reasonable likelihood" the jury was confused, because the jury announced it 
was confused.
The defendant in the case confessed to killing a police officer.  Arrested the day after the 
crime, Lonnie Weeks quickly confessed and expressed remorse.  Weeks articulated the desire to 
commit suicide because of his actions.
The judge informed the jury that if they found aggravation “then you may fix the 
punishment at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, 
then you shall fix the punishment at life imprisonment.”106
After four hours of deliberation, the jury asked if they found aggravation was their 
deliberation complete, or did they then still have to weigh whether a death sentence was 
appropriate.107  “If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the [aggravating 
factors], then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or must we decide…whether or 
not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the rule? Please clarify?”108
The defense asked the judge to instruct the jury that even if they found aggravation 
beyond a reasonable doubt they could still impose a life sentence. The judge declined, instead 
105 Weeks v. Angelone 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
106
 Id. at 229.
107
 Earlier in their deliberations the jury asked whether a sentence of life imprisonment included the 
possibility of parole. The judge told them "not to concern yourselves" with that matter (Id. at 228).  While 
this issue was not the focus of the Court's attention, the case is a further example of juror confusion over 
the meaning of life sentences (this will be discussed below).  The fact that the judge had already refused 
to answer a jury question, though, significantly undercuts an argument Rehnquist advanced that the jury 
would surely have continued asking and repeating questions if it remained confused.
108
 Id. at 229.
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repeating the original instruction without clarification. The judge noted,  “I don’t believe I can 
answer the question any clearer than the instruction.”109
The jury deliberated for two additional hours before returning a death sentence.
In another 5 to 4 decision written by Rehnquist, joined by Scalia and Thomas, the Court 
found the instruction “constitutionally sufficient.”110  Again the Court admitted the jury might 
have fundamentally misunderstood its charge: “there exists a slight possibility that the jury 
considered itself precluded from considering mitigating evidence.”111  But Rehnquist rebutted 
that fear because "a jury is presumed to follow its instructions" and "to understand a judge’s 
answer to its question.”112
Thus, the Court took the position that the jury must have understood an instruction it 
openly asked for help with upon receiving nothing more than the original instruction.
Moreover, Rehnquist advanced what he called “empirical” evidence of juror 
understanding.113  That is, since the jurors spent more than two hours deliberating after the 
judge's answer, they must have understood its meaning. “More than two hours passed between 
the judge directing the jury’s attention to the appropriate paragraph of the instruction that 
answered its question and the jury returning its verdict.  We cannot, of course, know for certain 
what transpired during those two hours.  But the most likely explanation is that the jury was 
doing exactly what it was instructed to do."114
109
 Id. at 229.
110
 Id. at 227.
111
 Id. at 236.
112
 Id. at 234.
113
 Id. at 234.
114
 Id. at 235. Or, perhaps the jury spent the two hours arguing over their original question, resolved the 
matter incorrectly, and swiftly proceeded to agree on a death sentence they erroneously believed they 
were obligated to impose.
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Presumably if the jury had returned almost immediately after the instruction Rehnquist 
would have seen that as evidence they had clearly understood the instruction because they were 
able to act so swiftly. This is no mere speculation, as ten minutes of deliberation following a jury 
question in Francis v. Franklin  was considered to be evidence of juror understanding in 
Rehnquist's dissent in that case. Here, staying out two additional hours was evidence of 
understanding. It is interesting to consider what length of time would possibly have been seen by 
Rehnquist as an indication of misunderstanding.  Indeed it seems more likely that Rehnquist has 
constructed an unfalsifiable standard where brevity of deliberations suggests easily understood 
standards and prolonged deliberations establish seriously undertaken discussion of evidence, but 
no length of deliberations implies misunderstanding of instructions. 
The majority further took as evidence of understanding the fact that the jury "did not 
inform the court that after reading the relevant paragraph of instruction, it still did not understand 
its role.”115 Indeed, Rehnquist concluded, "This particular jury demonstrated that it was not too 
shy to ask questions, suggesting that it would have asked another if it felt the judge’s response 
unsatisfactory.”116 In other words, after directly asking for clarification it did not receive, the 
Court takes as evidence of understanding the jury's lack of inclination to ask the exact same 
question again, which logically would have resulted in the same non-answer.117
Stevens asked in his dissent, "if the jurors found it necessary to ask the judge what that 
paragraph meant in the first place, why should we presume that they would find it any less 
ambiguous just because the judge told them to read it again?"118  Moreover, he questioned 
115
 Id. at 234.
116
 Id. at 235-236.
117
 As Stevens noted in his dissent (Id. at 243), “By the Court’s logic, a rather exceptionally assertive jury 
would have to question the judge at least twice and maybe more on precisely the same topic before one 
could find it no more than ‘reasonably likely’ that the jury was confused.”
118
 Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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attaching any significance to the jury's failure to repeat the question. "It seems to me far more 
likely that the reason they did not ask the same question a second time is that the jury believed 
that it would be disrespectful to repeat a simple, unambiguous question that the judge had 
already refused to answer directly."119
Similarly intriguing is the notion that the jury's question ultimately lends confidence to 
Rehnquist's conclusion that the jury understood its instructions.  If the jury had never asked a 
question, it would have been presumed to understand its instructions.  If, instead, the jury 
directly questioned an instruction fundamental to their duty, expressing complete uncertainty 
about the standard they were to apply and including the words, "What is the rule? Please 
clarify?” upon which point they received clarifying information, then the jury is presumed to 
understand its instructions. But then, even if, as in this case the jury posed that same question, 
then received no new information or clarification of any kind, the jury is presumed to understand 
its instructions.  Again Rehnquist has advanced an unfalsifiable standard – not asking a question 
is evidence of understanding, asking a question is evidence of understanding.120
Rehnquist's powers of jury mind-reading are not limited to legal interpretation.  The 
dissent noted that a majority of jurors were in tears when the death sentence was read, an unusual 
occurrence according to state court officials, suggesting to Stevens that some may have felt the 
sentence inappropriate.  Rehnquist countered that the unusual tears reflected exhaustion and a 
belief that the defendant "deserved the death sentence."121 Rehnquist does not elaborate on why  
119
 Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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 Even had the jury asked the same question twice, Rehnquist would have presumably asserted that 
something in the jury's third reading of the instructions had cleared the matter up for them, since, after all, 
they didn't ask the question yet again, and they continued deliberating for a period of time (either briefly 
or extensively) which was consistent with juror understanding.
121 Weeks v. Angelone 528 U.S. 225,  236 n.5 (2000). 
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what are presumably elements of nearly every jury death sentence should produce tears only in 
this rare instance. 
In dissent, Stevens made a basic case for  “clarity – clarity in the judge’s instructions 
when there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury may misunderstand the governing rule of 
law.”122
Even with the high standard for demonstrating juror confusion, Stevens argued that "this 
case establishes, not just a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that
the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death 
sentence was not ‘justified.’”123  That is, the jury could find aggravation had not been proved, or 
if aggravation had been proved, it could find the death penalty was not warranted after weighing 
mitigation. In contrast to Rehnquist's position that the jury's question demonstrated
understanding, “The fact that the jurors asked this question about that instruction demonstrates 
beyond peradventure that the instruction had confused them.  There would have been no reason 
to ask the question if they had understood the instruction to authorize a life sentence even though 
they found that an aggravator had been proved.”124
Given that the judge provided the confused jury no new information, Stevens asked 
where the majority found confidence that the jury was “magically satisfied by the repetition of 
the instruction that had not heretofore answered its question.”125
Stevens posited that "a non-lawyer" would have concluded death was the only available 
sentence if aggravation had been proved. There was simply “no reason to believe that the jury 
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understood the judge’s answer to its question” and therefore “overwhelming grounds for 
reversal.”126
Ultimately, Stevens, like Breyer in dissent in Buchanan, called for the "easy" step of 
giving the jury a "straightforward categorical answer to their simple question."127
Would Weeks' have received a death sentence if the jury had understood its duty to 
determine both aggravation and, separately, whether the sentence was warranted? A team of 
academics took up the question.
Using jury eligible subjects, Garvey, Johnson and Marcus (2000) created a series of 
simulated sentencing deliberations.  In each, subjects were given information on the case and the 
instructions provided by the judge.  But three different conditions were created with regard to the 
question on whether they needed to deliberate past finding aggravation.  The first group was 
never told of the jury's question in Weeks and asked to deliberate based on the original 
instructions. The second group was told of the jury's question, and, as occurred in the case, was 
provided a second reading of the original instructions. The third group was told of the jury's 
question and provided a plain language answer that they must deliberate on the question of 
whether to impose death even if they find aggravation.
The results were quite clear. At least half of the subjects in the first two groups thought 
that finding aggravation ended the need for deliberation and established the penalty at death. 
Even among the third group, given a plain language instruction that this was not true, one-fourth 
of the subjects held the same belief. More significantly, among those who correctly understood 
the obligation, a majority favored a life sentence.
126
 Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Together these cases establish a successful effort on the part of Rehnquist, joined by 
Scalia and Thomas, to establish two pillars that now undergird the Court’s approach to jury 
instructions in capital cases.  First, whether the instructions are clear or unclear, consistent or 
contradictory, explicit or unmentioned, jurors can be expected to understand their duties.  
Second, should the Court identify “one or two sentences”128 of unconstitutional instructions, or 
find evidence that a “reasonable juror”129 was misled, this is tolerable.  
Defining a Sentence
While capital jurors are apt to be confused by instructions regarding the sentencing 
decision, they are similarly flummoxed by the sentences themselves.  When jurors are asked to 
decide whether to impose a death sentence, the alternative typically available to them is to 
impose a life sentence.  What "life sentence" means provokes wildly different interpretations 
from jurors – and those beliefs are crucial to their sentencing pre ferences.  The belief that a "life 
sentence" is for a period of less than life dramatically increases the likelihood that a person will 
favor imposing a death sentence (O’Neil, Patry, and Penrod 2004). Indeed, interviews with 
former capital case jurors confirmed that the less time they understood a life sentence to require 
the more likely they were to support a death verdict.(Foglia 2003; Steiner, Bowers, and Sarat 
1999)
As was the case with the meaning and import of mitigation, the definition of a sentence
was discussed in the case in which the Court brought the death penalty back into legal use. In 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court declared that the Eighth Amendment demands that jurors be 
128
 Francis v. Franklin 471 U.S. 307, 331 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
129
 Boyde v. California 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).
38
given “accurate sentencing information” because it is “an indispensable prerequisite to a 
reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.”130
In the four cases highlighted below [California v. Ramos (1983)131; Simmons v. South 
Carolina (1994)132; Shafer v. South Carolina (2001)133; Kelly v. South Carolina (2002)134], the 
issue turned on juror understanding of the sentences they might impose. In the latter three cases, 
Scalia and Thomas dissented to make clear that they found no need to make plain to the jurors 
the meaning of the sentence they were considering (Rehnquist would join their position in the 
final case). In the first case, in which only Rehnquist participated, he joined a majority advancing 
the notion that the state may assert life sentences are something less than life sentences.
In typical criminal trials, jurors are called upon to determine guilt or innocence.  The 
length or nature of the sentence a defendant might face if found guilty is legally irrelevant to 
their proceedings.  Were the jurors to inquire about punishment, they would be told that 
punishment is not for their consideration.
In capital trials, jurors determine not only guilt or innocence, but they also impose a 
sentence. While telling jurors not to concern themselves with punishment may be a legally sound 
practice in other cases, it is also the default practice in capital cases in many jurisdictions.  That 
is, even though they are explicitly deciding upon a sentence, in effect jurors are commonly told 
not to concern themselves with the actual meaning of the sentence.
As such, when they ask if a "life sentence" means a term of life, or if it is for some 
shorter period of time, or if they ask whether parole is possible, jurors’ questions often go 
130 Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
131 California v. Ramos 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
132 Simmons v. South Carolina 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
133 Shafer v. South Carolina 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
134 Kelly v. South Carolina 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
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unanswered.  This despite the fact that confusion about these terms is widespread, and in some 
jurisdictions the meaning of "life sentence" has changed dramatically within recent years.
In Simmons v. South Carolina (1994), among the reasons the state argued Jonathan 
Simmons should be put to death was that he posed a future threat.  Executing Simmons, the 
prosecutor said, “will be an act of self-defense” for society.135
Jurors deliberating on Simmons' sentence were asked to choose between death and a 
sentence of life imprisonment. The jurors asked if the defendant was eligible for parole.
The judge not only refused to directly answer, but he had previously barred the defense 
from mentioning Simmons parole ineligibility during the proceedings.
Blackmun wrote for the Court's plurality that misunderstanding a “life sentence” created 
“a false dilemma"136 between a death sentence and a sentence to a  “limited period of 
incarceration.”137 Given that the prosecution argued the defendant would be danger to society, 
the defendant had a due process right to inform the jury that a life sentence would result in his 
imprisonment for the rest of his life because “in assessing future dangerousness, the actual 
duration of the defendant’s prison sentence is indisputably relevant.”138
That the meaning of "life sentence" was not commonly understood in the state seems well 
established. The defense presented contemporary polling data showing only 7% of jury eligible 
South Carolinians thought a life sentence carried with it a term of life.139 Nearly half thought a 
life sentence was 20 years or less, nearly three in four thought it was 30 years or less.
135 Simmons v. South Carolina 512 U.S. 154, 157 (1994).
136
 Id. at 171.
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Thus it was not entirely surprising when, after 90 minutes of deliberation, the jury asked, 
“Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?”140
The judge replied: "You are instructed not to consider parole or parole eligibility in 
reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for 
your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their 
plain and ordinary meaning."141
Given that 93% of state residents didn't know what the plain and ordinary meaning of 
"life imprisonment" was, the response was less than illuminating.142 A Blackmun put it, the jury 
“was denied a straight answer about petitioner’s parole eligibility even when it was
requested.”143
Indeed, Blackmun concluded that the judge's response not only didn't establish the truth 
about parole, but supported a misconception. “This instruction actually suggested that parole was 
available, but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact.  Undoubtedly, 
the instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury."144
Twenty five minutes after hearing the judge's response, the jury sentenced Simmons to 
death.
Interestingly, the judge's instructions were absolutely clear on the definition of the death 
sentence: "by the death penalty, we mean death by electrocution."145
140
 Id. at 160.
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Scalia, joined by Thomas, offered a dissent.  Scalia questioned the relevance of the parole 
issue and the future dangerousness argument.  “I am sure it was the sheer depravity of those 
crimes, rather than any specific fear for the future, which induced the South Carolina jury to 
conclude that the death penalty was justice.”146 It would be "quite farfetched" to think parole was 
a significant matter for the jury.147
If that was true, and parole was totally irrelevant, one must wonder why the prosecution 
vociferously objected to the jury being told parole was not available. 
Moreover, why would the jury ask about parole if its deliberations were not in any way 
affected by questions related to when the defendant might gain freedom and what he might do 
under those conditions.  Further, if the future dangerousness of the defendant was irrelevant to 
the jury, why did the prosecution bother making the argument, and how is Scalia in a better 
position to determine the value of the argument to the jury than the prosecutor who handled the 
case?
Nevertheless, Scalia asserted that the prosecutor's claim that executing Simmons will be 
"an act of self defense" was irrelevant to the jurors.  "This reference to 'self-defense' obviously 
alluded neither to defense of the jurors' own persons, nor specifically to defense of persons 
outside the prison walls, but to defense of all members of society against this individual, 
wherever he or they might be."148  How a phrase could allude to "all members of society" 
without alluding to the jurors and other "persons outside prison walls" is something of a semantic 
mystery.  
Beyond making the case that the parole issue was irrelevant, Scalia asserted that there 
was also a matter of fundamental fairness here. “Preventing the defense from introducing 
146
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evidence regarding parolability is only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from 
introducing it as well.”149
Just to be clear, Scalia has argued that not allowing the defense to define the true 
meaning of a life sentence is fair because the prosecution, were they to switch sides during the 
trial in an attempt to aid the defense, would also be prohibited from defining the life sentence.  
This is companion argument to the assertion that Rehnquist made in Francis v. Franklin that 
both the defense and prosecution were free to demonstrate the defendant lacked intent to kill.  
Apparently prosecutors switching teams in the middle of a trial must be fairly common, although 
it a phenomenon known only to the Court's most conservative members. 150
Ultimately, Scalia's dissent suggested his objection was less to the Court's conclusion 
than its larger implications for executions. The Court's standard is a “reasonable as a matter of 
policy,” he wrote, but sadly represents "another front in the guerilla war to make this 
unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical impossibility.”151
Seven years after Simmons the Court dealt with nearly the same question in another South 
Carolina capital case. In Shafer v. South Carolina (2001)152 the judge again provided sentencing 
instructions without defining life imprisonment. Despite the prosecution raising the specter of 
future dangerousness, the defense was barred from explaining to the jury that parole was not a 
149
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151 Simmons v. South Carolina 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994). (Scalia, J., dissenting). How a death sentence 
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possibility. The judge also rejected the defense's request that the language of the applicable state 
statute be read to the jury. [The statute explains that “'life imprisonment' means until death of the 
offender” and that there is no possibility of parole, furlough, or any type or fashion of release].
Again, confusion on the meaning of a life sentence ensued. About three and a half hours 
into deliberations the jury asked the judge: “Is there any remote chance for someone convicted of 
murder to become eligible for parole?”153  The judge replied: “Parole eligibility or ineligibility is 
not for your consideration.”154 Eighty minutes later the jury returned with a death sentence.  The 
defense asked that the jury be polled regarding their understanding of a life sentence, but the 
judge refused.
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Ginsburg concluded that the jury lacked “any clear 
understanding” of the life sentence they were meant to weigh against a death sentence.155
In a rather astonishing dissent, Thomas, joined by Scalia, asserted there was no evidence 
of juror confusion. “I believe that the court’s instructions and the arguments made by counsel in 
Shafer’s case were sufficient to inform the jury of what ‘life imprisonment’ meant for Shafer”156
and “left no room for speculation by the jury”157 on meaning of life sentence. 
What, then, did the jury mean to indicate when it asked about the potential for the 
defendant to be released? “I can only infer that the jury’s questions regarding parole referred not 
to Shafer’s parole eligibility in the event the jury sentenced Shafer to life, but rather to his parole 
eligibility in the event it did not sentence him at all.”158  In other words, Thomas takes the jury's 
direct question regarding their direct task, and concludes they meant to inquire not about 
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anything they were doing but rather wished to clarify a point of law that they had not raised and 
which had no bearing on them.
As was the case in Weeks v. Angelone, direct jury questions on topics which are widely 
misunderstood are taken here by Scalia and Thomas to be not so much indicators of confusion, 
but either indicators of understanding or interest in arcane legal points unrelated to the jurors' 
task.
The South Carolina legal system would produce yet another iteration of this basic 
controversy one year later. In Simmons, and again in Shafer, the Court had clearly established a 
defendant’s right to establish before the jury that parole was unavailable in response to 
prosecution efforts to establish future dangerousness.  In Kelly159 the state claimed (and the trial 
judge agreed) it had made no effort to establish future dangerousness and therefore no mention 
of parole ineligibility was warranted.  
The Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, took note of the prosecutor’s repeated characterizations of 
the defendant William Kelly.   The prosecutor called Kelly “Bloody Billy,”160 the “Butcher of 
Batesburg,”161 and noted he was “more frightening than a serial killer.”162 The prosecutor warned 
“murderers will be murderers. And he is a cold-blooded one right over there.”163
Souter, writing for the Court, highlighted several such examples as well as the overall 
thrust of the prosecutor’s presentation and concluded: “the evidence and argument…are flatly at 
odds with the view that ‘future dangerousness was not an issue in this case.’”164
159 Kelly v. South Carolina 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
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Rehnquist in dissent disputed the notion that future dangerousness came up in the case. 
“The prosecutor did not argue future dangerousness…in any meaningful sense of that term.”165
Curiously, Rehnquist admitted that “the prosecutor’s arguments about the details of the murder, 
as well as the violent episodes in prison, demonstrated petitioner’s evil character.”166  Thus, as 
Rehnquist would have it, the prosecutor sought and successfully established the defendant’s 
credentials for evil status, but somehow apparently implied his evilness had expired and carried 
no implications for the future.
Thomas, joined by Scalia, offered a separate dissent, not to dispute whether future 
dangerousness was raised in the case, but to reaffirm their position that the defendant should 
have no right to reveal parole information regardless of prosecution arguments.
While Simmons, Shafer, and Kelly were fought over the state not providing information 
about life sentences, California v. Ramos (1983)167 centered on the state giving additional 
information about life sentences.  In short, California law required the judge to inform the 
sentencing jury in a capital case that if they sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment the 
state's governor could commute the sentence to a shorter term.
Ramos' attorney argued such an instruction invited the jury to speculate, and was biased 
against the defendant because there was no mention of the fact that the governor had the same 
power to commute a death sentence. 
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court found the instruction permissible. O'Connor wrote for a 
majority which included Rehnquist.  Commutation "information is relevant and factually 
accurate,” O'Connor argued.168  “Informing the jury of the Governor's power to commute a 
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sentence of life without possibility of parole is merely an accurate statement of a potential 
sentencing alternative, and corrects the misconception conveyed by the phrase 'life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole.'”169
Indeed, the Court went on to assert that without this information "life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole" would create a "misleading impression" that release was 
impossible.170 The commutation instruction “dispels that possible misunderstanding” leaving 
little room for the defense to object as “surely, the respondent cannot argue that the Constitution 
prohibits the State from accurately characterizing its sentencing choices.”171
The Court apparently had no concern that the sentence of death – which carries with it the 
precise equivalent legal possibility of commutation – is in any way misleading because it too can 
result ultimately in the defendant being set free.  As Marshall argued in dissent “the instruction 
thus erroneously suggests to the jury that a death sentence will assure the defendant’s permanent 
removal from society whereas the alternative sentence will not.”172
Stevens argued in the dissent that the Court should show no tolerance for biased jury 
instructions. “No matter how trivial the impact of the instruction may be, it is fundamentally 
wrong for the presiding judge at the trial - who should personify the evenhanded administration 
of justice" to provide the jury one-sided information.173
As in Ramos, in Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988)174 leeway denied to the defense was 
generously provided to the state.  In Lowenfield, a capital jury spent 13 hours in sentencing 
deliberation and reported to the judge that they had reached a deadlock. At one point the jury 
169
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reported to the judge that it was experiencing "much distress."175 The judge replied: "I order you 
to go back to the jury room and to deliberate and arrive at a verdict."176
Later, when the jury again reported difficulty, the judge twice polled the jurors to ask if 
further deliberations would be useful – and reminded the jurors for what would be the fourth 
time since the conclusion of the case that if they failed to reach a verdict the defendant would be 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  The judge's polls, which required the jurors to sign their name to 
their vote, in effect forced the jurors to take a position on the verdict since further deliberations 
were necessary for a death sentence.  After the first poll found 8 in favor of continuing 
deliberations, the judge repeated the process and found 11 in favor of continuing deliberations. 
Just 30 minutes after the polls the jury returned a death sentence.  Despite the seemingly tilted 
nature of the judge's instructions, his command to continue deliberating, his repeated 
admonitions on the consequences of deadlock ("Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you 
earlier if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a recommendation the Court shall impose 
the sentence of Life Imprisonment"),177 Rehnquist wrote for the Court that while the judge's 
instruction "suggests the possibility of coercion" the instruction was "not 'coercive' in such a 
way" as to deny the defendant's rights.178
Ultimately, the conservatives proved themselves willing to tolerate sentencing definition  
rules which tend to establish the defendant as a threat.  Whether that be through the withholding 
of information pertaining to parole ineligibility, the one-sided presentation regarding 
commutation possibility, or the browbeating of trial judge to push the jury out of its deadlock, 
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the jury instruction rules the conservatives support consistently provide freedom for the 
prosecution and limitation on the defense.  
Even as the current Court majority has provided for the defendant’s right to define parole 
ineligibility, it is a quite narrow right.  Only when the prosecution seeks to establish future 
dangerousness, and only when life without possibility of parole is the sole available alternative 
sentence does a defendant have a right to define the meaning of life sentence.  Even in that 
limited instance, however, it is clear the right is far from firmly established.  Kelly produced only 
five votes for the defendant’s right to define life sentence, with two dissenters (Thomas and 
Scalia) asserting there is no such right in any circumstance.  
Creating Understandable Instructions
Rehnquist wrote in Buchanan v. Angelone that the jury could not have been confused 
because "the instruction presents a simple decisional tree.”179 He meant that metaphorically.  The 
practical meaning of the instructions in Buchanan would be difficult for any non-lawyer to 
explain. Indeed, there is no shortage of evidence on the point that jurors have trouble 
understanding typical capital sentencing instructions.
Ironically, among the suggestions researchers have made to improve comprehension of 
instructions is to provide jurors with decision trees or flowcharts (Wiener et al 2004).  That is to 
say, actual decision trees in which each plainly worded question points the jurors to the next 
issue they must decide, not metaphorical decision trees that exist only in the mind of a Supreme 
Court justice.
Plain and direct language would also aid jurors in carrying out their task.  As Souter 
argued in his concurring opinion in Simmons, jurors should be given "instructions on the 
179 Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 277 n.4 (1998).
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meaning of the legal terms used”180 and when questions arise they should be answered directly.  
When the Simmons jury asked "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility 
of parole?" Souter wrote, "The answer here was easy, and controlled by state statute. The judge 
should have said no."181  Concomitantly, in his dissent in Weeks, Stevens issued a call for 
"clarity"182 in jury instructions. Should the jury fail to understand and ask a question, a 
"straightforward categorical answer" should be provided.183 At the very least, Breyer suggested it 
would be helpful if instructions on mitigation included the "mention of mitigating evidence 
anywhere in the instructions.”184
In their simulation using members of the jury pool, Frank and Applegate (1998) found 
that rewriting juror instructions in plain language improved juror comprehension scores by 20%.  
Among the areas jurors showed the most improvement on was understanding of mitigation, 
including what counts as mitigation, what is the standard for demonstrating mitigation, and 
whether every juror must agree to apply the same mitigating piece of evidence to find mitigation. 
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini (1982) and Wiener, Pritchard, and Weston (1995) also found 
significantly higher comprehension with plain language instructions.
In their massive jury simulation, Wiener and his coauthors (2004) tested not only plain 
language instructions, but also a flowchart instruction, and instructions with specific 
clarifications on common misconceptions.  These various instruction forms were tested against 
traditional instructions.  The plain language instructions had the most dramatic effect, in some 
areas doubling comprehension rates on such matters as mitigation.  Other forms of instruction 
also produced gains over the traditional instructions.
180 Simmons v. South Carolina 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
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While scholars have established both the depth of misunderstanding in response to 
traditional juror instructions, as well as the promise of user-friendly instructions, the Court 
remains largely aloof.  If the Court is to give true effect to its expanding right to a jury, though, it 
must turn away from its line of juror instruction cases in which it has established an expanding 
jurisprudence of permissible confusion.
Juror Exclusion
Belief Exclusion
Given the unique obligations of a capital case juror, the Court has recognized the 
significant effect personal values might have in inhibiting jurors from following their instructions 
and applying the law.  In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) and subsequent cases, the Court 
concluded that a juror can be excluded from participation in a capital case if his views "would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and oath."185
Such exclusion applies both to those who would never impose the death penalty as well 
as those who would always impose the death sentence in a capital case. "[A] State may not 
entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a 
verdict of death."186
To give effect to this requirement, prospective jurors are questioned during voir dire to 
determine their death penalty views and if those views would impair their ability to reach a 
verdict based on the law and the evidence at hand. In effect, the so called "death qualification" 
process allows the prosecution to challenge for cause and thereby remove prospective jurors who 
state, for example, that they would never vote to impose the death penalty, and the defense to 
185 Adams v. Texas 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
186 Witherspoon v. Illinois 391 U.S. 510,  521 (1968).
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challenge and remove the comparatively rare individual who states they would always vote to 
impose the death penalty.
While the concept of death qualification is relatively straightforward, the line between 
who is acceptable and who must be excluded is not always clear, nor are the parameters of the 
qualification process.  Moreover, academic research makes it quite clear that death qualification 
dramatically affects the makeup of juries beyond its stated purpose.
Not surprisingly, those who can be excluded based on their opposition to the death 
penalty are more likely to pay attention to mitigating evidence (Butler 2000; Luginbuhl and 
Middendorf 1988) and less likely to accept the cost of convicting the innocent over freeing the 
guilty (Young 2004). Notably, they are also less likely to hold racist beliefs (Young 2004), more 
likely to remember evidence, accurately understand the law, and thoroughly weigh the evidence
(Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth 1984).
Even more to the point, contrary to the premise of death qualification, evidence suggests 
that many excludables who oppose the death penalty would actually be willing to impose a death 
sentence.  That is, while excludables may report an abstract unwillingness to impose the death 
penalty sufficient to have them removed for cause from the jury, when presented with evidence 
on specific cases, the majority report favoring the death penalty's application for particularly 
heinous murders (Cox and Tanford 1989; Robinson 1993) .
Relative to excludables, includables meanwhile are conviction prone. Meta-analyses of 
studies on death penalty includeables show they are up to 40% more likely to favor conviction in 
individual cases (Allen, Mabry, and McKelton 1998) while other studies reveal the difference is 
particularly great when the evidence is weakest (Filkins, Smith, and Tindale 1998). 
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Among the factors in includables’ conviction tendencies is their generally held belief that 
the prosecution is more trustworthy than the defense (Fitzgerald and Ellsworth 1984).  In a jury 
simulation, Thompson and colleagues showed participants conflicting evidence variously 
supporting the prosecution or the defense's position (Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, and 
Harrignton 1984).  Includables were far more likely to accept the prosecution's perspective.  In 
contrast to excludables, includables were more likely to fear erroneous acquittals than erroneous 
convictions (Thompson et al 1984).
Meanwhile, contrary to the premise of their inclusion, more than one forth of includables 
express the belief that the death penalty should be imposed after every capital case conviction
(Dillehay and Sandys 1996).187
In each of the five death qualification cases discussed below Rehnquist supported an 
expansive prosecutorial right to cleanse the jury of death penalty skeptics and a narrow defense 
right to purge the jury of death penalty enthusiasts. (In the three cases Scalia heard and the one 
Thomas participated in, they joined Rehnquist's position).  Overall, the thrust of the 
conservatives' position is what they consider to be the state's right to an impartial jury (while 
casting a skeptical eye on defendant’s countervailing claims).
In Adams v. Texas (1980)188 the judge asked jurors if they held any beliefs regarding the 
death penalty which would  "affect their deliberations on any issue of fact."189 Jurors who said 
yes were excused.
187
 Indeed, many jurors found qualified to serve on capital cases are apt to demonstrate not mere 
acceptance of the death penalty, but enthusiasm.  In Miller-El v. Dretke XX U.S. XX (2005), Thomas 
quoted one juror (Mr. Woods) whose only reservation regarding the death penalty was that it could be 
"too quick." Instead the juror would "pour some honey on them and stake them out over an ant bed."  As 
Thomas noted,  "It is beyond cavil why the State accepted Woods as a juror: He could impose the 
punishment sought by the State." (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188 Adams v. Texas 448 U.S. 38 (1980). Adams’ case was brought to the nation's attention in the 
documentary The Thin Blue Line (1988) which presented significant evidence suggesting Adams was 
53
The state argued this was a fair means of determining death penalty excludables. The 
defense countered that the state had re-written a standard which allowed people to be excluded 
only if their views "would prevent or substantially impair" them from carrying out their duties to 
a new lower standard rejecting jurors who might be affected in any way by the weight of a death 
proceeding.190
In an 8 to 1 opinion (Rehnquist dissenting), the Court held that Texas law had created an 
unreasonable standard which had the effect of excluding jurors "whose only fault was to take 
their responsibilities with special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they might or 
might not be affected."191
"Nervousness" and "emotional involvement" were inherent in a death proceeding, the 
Court argued, thus the "inability to deny…any effect whatsoever" is in no way "equivalent to an 
unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court's instructions and obey 
their oaths."192
In short, the Court reaffirmed that jurors may not be excluded "on any broader basis than 
inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths."193
In dissent, Rehnquist said he could "see no reason why Texas should not be entitled to 
require each juror to swear" that he or she will be unaffected by the possibility of a death 
sentence.194
uninvolved in the murder for which he was sentenced to death.  Adams’ conviction was overturned in 
1989 and prosecutors did not seek to try him again.
189
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 Id. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Further, foreshadowing an argument Scalia would offer in Holland v. Illinois (1990), 
Rehnquist asserted that  "society, as much as the defendant, has a right to an impartial jury."195
In Lockhart v. McCree (1986)196 the entire process of death qualification was challenged 
as an impediment to an impartial jury reflecting a cross section of society. Before McCree's 
capital murder trial, the judge removed for cause jurors who said they could not impose death 
penalty. The jury convicted McCree of murder but later sentenced him to life imprisonment.  
McCree's attorneys argued that the death qualification process had created a conviction prone 
jury.
In a 6 to 3 opinion written by Rehnquist, the Court found that death qualification did not 
violate the defendant's rights because the Constitution "does not require that petit juries actually 
chosen reflect the composition of the community at large."197  Moreover, death qualification does 
not "violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury…because all individual jurors are to 
some extent predisposed towards one result or another."198
Lower courts had sided with McCree, finding that "social science evidence" showed "that 
'death qualification' produced juries that 'were more prone to convict' capital defendants than 
'non-death qualified' juries."199
Rehnquist dismissed the studies because of what he said were "several serious flaws in 
the evidence."200 Quoting language used when the Court weighed the same issue two decades 
earlier, Rehnquist labeled the research "too tentative and fragmentary."201
195
 Id. at 55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
196 Lockhart v. McCree 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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Some of the studies referred to in this chapter, [for example Cowan, Thompson and 
Ellsworth (1984)] were before the Court then, but were deemed of no value because they were 
based on surveys and simulations, not the deliberations of actual jurors hearing applicable cases. 
[Of course, as Marshall pointed out in dissent, studying the deliberations of actual jurors in 
actual cases is legally impossible, and not something any court would accommodate. Leaving 
surveys and simulations "the only available means of proving their case."]202
Rehnquist also dismissed McCree's claim that he was denied a jury consisting of a "fair-
cross-section" of society. 203  Death penalty excludables are not "a 'distinctive' group in the 
community"204 thus McCree has no right that they be included at any stage of the jury process.
Oddly, Rehnquist made much of the fact that McCree's jury, which had been subject to 
death qualification, produced a panel which could have been the product of the "luck of the 
draw."205 Rehnquist elaborated, "it is hard for us to understand the logic of the argument that a 
given jury is unconstitutionally partial when it results from a state-ordained process, yet impartial 
when exactly the same jury results from mere chance."206
But in any given case chance could produce an all male jury or an all white jury.  Surely 
the fact that "mere chance" could produce a panel would not justify any mechanism of 
discrimination the state wished to create.
Rehnquist added that if one were to follow McCree's "illogical and hopelessly 
impractical" standard, that is "if it were true that the Constitution required a certain mix of 
individual viewpoints on the jury, then trial judges would be required to undertake the Sisyphean 
task of 'balancing' juries, making sure that each contains the proper number of Democrats and 
202 Lockhart v. McCree 476 U.S. 162, 189 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203 Lockhart at 174.
204 Id. at 174.
205
 Id. at 178.
206
 Id. at 178.
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Republicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and blue-collar laborers, 
and so on."207
Again Rehnquist mixed the concepts of exclusion and random chance.  It was not random 
chance that created the panel McCree objected to, it was the practice of death qualification.  As 
there is no political party qualification, age qualification, or occupation qualification for jury 
service, none of these factors is remotely congruent. 
While Rehnquist dismissed the social science research presented in the case, in dissent 
Marshall referred to it as "overwhelming evidence that death-qualified juries are substantially 
more likely to convict."208 Rather than questioning varying research practices, Marshall took 
confidence from "the essential unanimity of the results obtained by researchers using diverse 
subjects and varied methodologies"209
Marshall noted that the death qualification process has a disparate effect on groups more 
likely to hold anti-death penalty views, thus excluding more women and African Americans from 
jury service. 
Marshall suggested that capital defendants suffer a double burden.  First, unlike 
defendants for other crimes, capital defendants are burdened with a jury which has been 
systematically and legally structured to increase the likelihood of conviction.  Second, "I cannot 
help thinking that respondent here would have stood a far better chance of prevailing on his 
constitutional claims had he not been challenging a procedure peculiar to the administration of 
the death penalty. For in no other context would a majority of this Court refuse to find any 
207
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constitutional violation in a state practice that systematically operates to render juries more likely 
to convict, and to convict on the more serious charges."210
Thus the absurd possibility Marshall implied: it may be easier to convict someone of 
capital murder than of a lesser crime.
In Gray v. Mississippi (1987)211 the judge excluded a legally qualified juror for cause at 
the prosecution's request.  In effect the judge excluded the juror to compensate the prosecutor for 
previous decisions the judge made to deny the prosecutor's earlier challenges.
The case then hinged on whether the disqualification of a qualified juror was a sufficient 
error to require the case be overturned, or whether the decision should be considered 
"harmless."212
In a 5 to 4 decision written by Blackmun, the Court employed a standard based on 
"whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the 
trial court's error" reasoning that "the nature of the selection process defies any attempt to 
establish that an erroneous Witherspoon exclusion is harmless."213
Scalia offered a dissent, joined by Rehnquist.  
In a group voir dire, jurors were asked questions to establish whether they were death 
qualified. Apparently realizing that if they said they would not impose the death penalty they 
would be excused, an otherwise unprecedented number of prospective jurors announced their 
opposition to the death penalty.  The judge grew suspicious that they were misleading him to 
dodge service on the jury, at one point saying, "Now I don't want nobody telling me that, just to 
210
 Id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211 Gray v. Mississippi 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
212
 Id. at 651.
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 Id. at 665.
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get off the jury. Now, that's not being fair with me."214 Because he doubted their sincerity, the 
judge began to disallow traditional challenges for cause when jurors said they were reluctant to 
impose the death penalty.  Instead, the prosecutor had to use many of his nine peremptory 
challenges to remove jurors who claimed to be anti-death penalty.
After exhausting his peremptory challenges, the prosecutor sought to exclude a 
prospective juror, Mrs. Bounds, who initially expressed hesitation about the death penalty before 
saying she was able to impose it.  The prosecutor asked for an extra peremptory to compensate 
for the challenges he had used on jurors the judge refused to dismiss for cause.
Rejecting the notion of giving the prosecutor an extra challenge, the judge instead 
suggested they see if there was a way Mrs. Bounds might be excluded for cause. The judge told 
the prosecutor: "Go ask her if she'd vote guilty or not guilty…let's see what she says to that. If 
she gets to equivocating on that, I'm going to let her off as a person who can't make up her 
mind."215
When Mrs. Bounds said she did not know whether she would vote guilty or not (she had, 
after all, not heard any evidence since the trial had not yet begun), the judge ruled that she was 
"totally indecisive. She says one thing one time and one thing another."216  The judge dismissed 
her for cause.
Admitting that the prosecutor had, in effect, lost some of his peremptory challenges to the 
judge's decision making, Blackmun nevertheless concluded that "we cannot condone the 
'correction' of one error by the commitment of another."217
214
 Id. at 653.
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216
 Id. at 656 n.7.
217
 Id. at 663.
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Meanwhile, Blackmun concluded that the improper exclusion of a qualified juror could 
not be tolerated: "some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error. The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is 
such a right."218
Scalia's dissent objected to nearly every premise of the majority opinion.  Scalia believed 
the judge would have been justified in granting the prosecution an extra peremptory challenge, 
therefore Bounds would not have been on the jury, therefore the defendant suffered no harm 
when Bounds was removed for cause. 
Scalia claimed that it is "certain that the jury that was impaneled was identical to the jury 
that would have been impaneled had the trial judge not erred"219 in refusing the prosecution's 
earlier for cause challenges. Later Scalia repeated his conclusion that it was "certain that the trial 
judge's decision to exclude Mrs. Bounds for cause rather than granting that request [for an 
additional peremptory challenge] did not affect the composition of the jury in any way."220
Scalia went on to say the judge's decision "could not possibly have affected the composition of 
the jury"221 and that the resulting jury was "identical"222 to the panel that otherwise would have 
been created. Given there was no effect on the jury, and therefore no effect on the defendant, 
"There is thus no reason to vacate petitioner's sentence."223
218
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Where the authority to grant the prosecution, and only the prosecution, extra peremptory 
challenges comes from Scalia did not specify.224  Moreover, how he could be "certain" that the 
resulting jury was "identical" is also hard to fathom since, presumably, a prosecutor armed with 
an extra peremptory challenge would weigh the acceptability of every juror with a different 
standard and would therefore adjust his strategy of using the challenges.  Both Blackmun in the 
majority opinion and Powell in his concurring opinion note that the prosecutor may or may not 
have actually excluded Bounds if he had an extra challenge, but it is inconceivable that he would 
have engaged in precisely the same series of challenges regardless of the number of challenges 
he had at his disposal. Moreover, if the defense were to also be granted an extra challenge in the 
interests of fairness the notion that an "identical" jury panel would emerge becomes all the more 
absurd.
The year after the Court decided Gray, it was confronted by almost the opposite set of 
circumstances.  Rather than removing an eligible juror at the prosecution's request, in Ross v. 
Oklahoma (1988)225 the judge failed to remove an ineligible juror at the defense's request.
In a 5 to 4 decision, Rehnquist wrote for the Court that the judge had indeed "erred" in 
failing to "remove a juror whom the trial court should have excused for cause"226 because he 
stated he would support the death penalty for the defendant regardless of the evidence or law.  
However, since the defense was able to strike the juror (Mr. Huling) using a peremptory 
challenge, the error did not compromise petitioner's "Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury."227 That is, "petitioner exercised a peremptory challenge to remove him, and 
224
 Indeed, the state admitted there was no law supporting the capacity of a judge to grant an additional 
peremptory challenge.  In the few documented occurrences when an additional peremptory challenge was 
granted, however, both sides received an equal number of additional challenges (Id. at 654 n.6).
225 Ross v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
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Huling was thereby removed from the jury as effectively as if the trial court had excused him for 
cause."228
The standard announced in Gray (the "relevant inquiry is whether the composition of the 
jury penal as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error"229) suggests the 
verdict must be overturned since Ross' jury was indisputably affected by what amounted to the 
defense's loss of a peremptory challenge. "Although we agree that the failure to remove Huling 
may have resulted in a jury panel different from that which would otherwise have decided the
case," Rehnquist failed to see a reason to apply the Court's finding in Gray because it was  "too 
sweeping to be applied literally."230
The defense's loss of a peremptory challenge is not a "constitutional problem" because 
"we reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury" as "peremptory challenges are not of constitutional 
dimension."231
Oklahoma state law specifies that defendants must use peremptories to exclude jurors 
whom the judge has erroneously allowed to sit. "As required by Oklahoma law, petitioner 
exercised one of his peremptory challenges to rectify the trial court's error, and consequently he 
retained only eight peremptory challenges to use in his unfettered discretion. But he received all 
that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails."232
228
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To Rehnquist, "There is nothing arbitrary or irrational" about such a policy as it serves 
"the goal of empaneling an impartial jury."233  This statement is made without limitation. Thus if 
the judge refused to exclude 9 ineligible pro-death penalty jurors, while simultaneously granting 
prosecution challenges to anti-death penalty jurors, effectively preserving all peremptories for 
the prosecution while eliminating them for the defense, there would be "nothing arbitrary or 
irrational" about such an outcome.
Indeed, Rehnquist noted that loss of all peremptories to correct for a judge's error would 
be acceptable because "the error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all 
peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him."234
Limitations on the use of peremptory challenges are portrayed as not only reasonable but 
obvious. "The concept of a peremptory challenge as a totally free-wheeling right unconstrained 
by any procedural requirement is difficult to imagine."235
Interestingly, Huling's bias was so clear that "had Huling sat on the jury that ultimately 
sentenced petitioner to death…the sentence would have to be overturned."236  However, 
Rehnquist questioned the notion that the panel that ultimately formed was less than impartial 
because "none of those 12 jurors…was challenged for cause by petitioner."237  (Which is to say, 
under Rehnquist's logic, when the challenge of a blatantly biased juror is rebuffed, the defense 
should have responded by challenging jurors whose responses were less egregiously biased).
Marshall issued an angry dissent. "A man's life is at stake. We should not be playing 
games."238
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The logic of forcing the defense to use one of its peremptory challenges to correct a 
judge's error was lost on Marshall. "In this case, everyone concedes that the trial judge could not 
arbitrarily take away one of the defendant's peremptory challenges. Yet, that is in effect exactly 
what happened here."239
Marshall could not comprehend how the Court could fail to apply the Gray precedent 
because "here the trial court, rather than excusing a qualified juror, refused to excuse a biased 
juror" but "the loss of a peremptory challenge in this case affected the composition of the jury 
panel in precisely the same way as the trial court's error in Gray itself."240
In Morgan v. Illinois (1992)241, the prosecution requested that the judge ask all 
prospective jurors if they would automatically vote against imposing the death penalty.  The 
judge agreed.  The defense then requested that the judge ask all prospective jurors if they would 
automatically vote for imposing the death penalty. The judge declined.
Recall in Ross that Rehnquist's opinion, joined by Scalia, asserted that had someone who 
would automatically vote for a death sentence "sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced 
petitioner to death…the sentence would have to be overturned."242  Such a position seemingly 
would lock Rehnquist and Scalia into supporting a death qualification question on the inclination 
to automatically impose death, for how else would the defense know of a juror's position, and 
how else could the defense act upon the rights Rehnquist discussed in Ross.
Instead, while six members of the Court found the refusal to inquire about automatic 
imposition of the death penalty to be a due process violation, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas 
dissented. 
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In an opinion written by White, the Court noted that "a juror who will automatically vote 
for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do."243 The state was empowered 
to remove anti-death penalty persons from the jury with the right to ask about opposition to 
capital punishment, but how could a defendant "exercise intelligently his complementary 
challenge for cause against those biased persons on the venire who as jurors would unwaveringly 
impose death" if he could not ask questions to identify pro-death penalty excludables.244 Without 
opportunity to ask a relevant question of prospective jurors, the right to challenge for cause 
becomes a "meaningless" right.245
In contrast to the prosecution's direct question, the defense was left to work with only a 
general question about whether prospective jurors thought they could be fair.
Scalia's dissent, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas, directly contradicted the language of 
the Ross decision authored by Rehnquist and signed by Scalia a year earlier. Gone is their 
conclusion that a single juror who would automatically vote to impose death would mean "the 
sentence would have to be overturned."246  It is replaced with a sneering renouncement of the 
Court's position in Ross, which is to say, a sneering renouncement of their own position in Ross.  
Scalia wrote: "The Court today holds that a juror who will always impose the death penalty for 
capital murder is not 'impartial.'247  He added, "The Court has, in effect, now added the new rule 
that no merciless jurors can sit."248
243 Morgan v. Illinois 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
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In direct language Scalia stated: "The fact that a particular juror thinks the death penalty 
proper whenever capital murder is established does not disqualify him" because there is no 
"requirement that all jurors must, on the facts of the case, be amenable to entertaining" a 
sentence less than death.249
Scalia coined a new phrase when he concluded "the Court's exclusion of these death-
inclined jurors" is not "justified."250
A juror who would automatically impose the death penalty is admitting they would 
automatically dismiss any and all mitigating evidence. Scalia sees no problem with that because 
"we have held, not that he must consider mitigating evidence, but only that he may not, on legal 
grounds, refuse to consider it."251  Thus Scalia distinguishes between the right to have evidence 
considered and the right to not have evidence not considered (which heretofore have been 
amounted to the same thing).  That is, for example, the right of criminal defendants to counsel is 
effectively the same as the right not to be forced to not have counsel.
Scalia proceeded to argue that since Illinois had absolutely no standard to define 
mitigation ("what constitutes mitigation is not defined and is left up to the judgment of each 
juror"252) it is perfectly reasonable for jurors to impose a personal standard which effectively 
recognized no forms of mitigation.
Scalia's position that mitigation goes undefined is somewhat harder to defend upon 
consulting the relevant Illinois statute [Chapter 38, 9-1(c), 1990] which states: 
Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following: 
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
249
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(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to 
prosecution; 
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act; 
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent 
infliction of death or great bodily harm; 
(5) the defendant was not personally present during commission of the act or acts causing 
death. 
Nevertheless, Scalia drew a distinction between jurors who would never impose the death 
penalty and those who would always impose the death penalty. The former "juror is a lawless 
juror," the latter "juror to be disqualified under the Court's new rule is not."253
Scalia's point again neatly ignores the applicable state law in the case.  Illinois law 
explicitly states "the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors" – and "if the jury 
determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition 
of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death."  Quite distinct from 
Scalia's semantic jumble, Morgan had a right to have mitigating factors considered and any juror 
who would automatically impose a death sentence was without question a "lawless juror."
White responded directly to Scalia's position: "Justice Scalia, in dissent, insists that 
Illinois is entitled to try a death penalty case with 1 or even 12 jurors who, upon inquiry, 
announce that they would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if the defendant is 
found guilty of a capital offense, no matter what the so-called mitigating factors, whether 
statutory or nonstatutory, might be. But such jurors obviously deem mitigating evidence to be 
irrelevant to their decision to impose the death penalty…"254 and are therefore "announcing an 
intention not to follow the instructions."255
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The essence of the conservatives' holding on death qualification is this: it is acceptable 
when a judge strikes a juror for cause when that juror suggests the slightest hesitation to impose 
the death penalty.  It is acceptable when a judge fails to strike for cause a juror who says the 
death penalty should be automatically imposed.  It is acceptable when a judge goes to great 
lengths questioning a juror seeking a pretense to strike her on the prosecution's behalf.  It is 
acceptable when a judge refuses a defense request to ask even the most basic and fundamental 
question regarding whether a juror intends to follow the law.  It is acceptable that death 
qualification advances the participation of conviction prone jurors.  It is, in Rehnquist's words, a 
defense of the state's right to an impartial trial.  As a Constitutional matter the state holds no such 
right.  Nevertheless, the conservatives’ creativity in advancing a state’s right to impartial trials is 
clearly magnified by their wobbly definition of impartial.
Trait Exclusion
While the Court has weighed the right to exclude jurors based on their beliefs, so too has 
it been faced with the even more thorny (although sometimes concurrent) effort to exclude jurors 
based on race.
Race, it would seem apparent, infects the capital prosecution process. Baldus and 
colleagues (1990) found an African American defendant accused of killing a white person was 
11 times more likely to be sentenced to death than a white defendant accused of killing an 
African American.  Keil and Vito (1995) show that the racial imbalance reflects both an 
increased likelihood that capital charges will be filed against the former and an increased 
likelihood that once capital charges are filed a death sentence will be returned.  Radelet (1989)
has calculated that less than two-tenths of one percent of the executions in this country have been 
in response to a white person killing an African American.
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One factor in these patterns is surely the response of the jury.  Researchers have found 
notable differences in response to the race of the defendant and the race of the victim (Lynch 
1997; Lynch and Haney 2000;  Edelman 2004). 
The Court, sensitive to both the reality and appearance of bias, has at times thundered 
against the exclusion of jurors.  In Strauder v. West Virginia (1880), the Court confronted a state 
law barring African Americans from jury service. The Court struck the law down because: "The 
very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is 
selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having 
the same legal status in society as that which he holds."256 Jurors must be "indifferently chosen" 
with regard to race to secure a defendant's right to "protection of life and liberty."257  The Court 
suggested that in this area the judiciary should be held not only to a legal standard but a societal 
standard because discrimination inside a courthouse is "a stimulant to that race prejudice which 
is an impediment to securing …equal justice."258
Notable then are the efforts of Rehnquist and his conservative colleagues a century later 
to defend exclusion and differential treatment on the basis of race. While the series of cases are 
not exclusively capital prosecutions, they illustrate the foundation of their thinking as it applies 
to trait exclusion of jurors in capital proceedings, and they represent the foundation of their 
conclusions in the multiple hearings of the Miller-El death penalty appeal.
In Batson v. Kentucky (1986),259 and subsequent juror exclusion cases, the means of 
achieving exclusion was the peremptory challenge.  Batson, an African American on trial for 
burglary, objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove all of the 
256 Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
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prospective African American jurors from serving on his jury.  Batson claimed a violation of the 
fair cross section requirement and the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
In a 7 to 2 decision, the Court agreed. Writing for the Court, Powell concluded that "the 
defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to 
nondiscriminatory criteria."260  Further, "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to 
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race."261  To operationalize this right, the 
Court ruled that if a prosecutor engages in an apparent pattern of racial exclusion the burden will 
be placed on the prosecutor to demonstrate that there was some non-race based rationale that 
guided the decision on whom to challenge.262
Rehnquist again dissented from a holding that would protect equal access to juries.  In the 
process, Rehnquist offered a strong defense of the peremptory challenge.  "I cannot subscribe to 
the Court's unprecedented use of the Equal Protection Clause to restrict the historic scope of the 
peremptory challenge, which has been described as 'a necessary part of trial by jury.' In my view, 
there is simply nothing 'unequal' about the State's using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks 
from the jury..."263  Thus, in addition to accommodating the "historic" nature of peremptory 
challenges, Rehnquist accommodates the "historic" nature of racism.
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 In a concurring opinion, Marshall argued that prosecutors will almost always be able to advance some 
kind of explanation for employing peremptory challenges against African Americans, even if the 
explanation is false. "How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the 
juror had a son about the same age as defendant, or seemed 'uncommunicative,' or 'never cracked a smile' 
and, therefore 'did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the 
facts in this case.' If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's 
obligation to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court today may 
be illusory." [Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring)]. Ultimately, Marshall concluded, "The decision today 
will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal 
can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely." (Id. at 102-103).
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Indeed, he characterized race-based thinking as "extremely useful."264
"The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a 'proxy' for potential 
juror partiality…has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of 
peremptory challenges….Given the need for reasonable limitations on the time devoted to voir 
dire, the use of such 'proxies' by both the State and the defendant may be extremely useful in 
eliminating from the jury persons who might be biased in one way or another."265
Four years after Batson, Daniel Holland objected to peremptory challenges used by the 
prosecution to create an all-white jury in his kidnapping trial (Holland v. Illinois 1990266). Unlike 
Batson, however, Holland was white.  Holland objected to the exclusion of African Americans 
on 6th Amendment fair cross section grounds.
In a 5 to 4 decision, written by Scalia and joined by Rehnquist, the Court offered an even 
more forceful defense of peremptory challenges. An impartial jury "compels peremptory 
challenges."267 Scalia concluded that under the 6th Amendment we are guaranteed "not a 
representative jury…but an impartial one"268 and an impartial jury "would positively be 
obstructed"269 by a petit jury fair cross section requirement, because one would have to 
264
 Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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 Id. at 138-139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Rehnquist offered a similar defense of efforts to remove 
women from the jury. In his dissent in J.E.B. v. Alabama 511 U.S. 127, 156 (1994), Rehnquist reiterated 
that there is a rational basis for sex based jury exclusion: "I think the State has shown that jury strikes on 
the basis of gender 'substantially further' the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial 
trial."
266 Holland v. Illinois 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
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 Id. at 482 (emphasis in original).
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"cripple"270 the peremptory challenge which "would undermine rather than further the 
Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by 'an impartial jury.'"271
"The rule we announce today is not only the only plausible reading of the text of the 
Sixth Amendment, but we think it best furthers the Amendment's central purpose as well. 
Although the constitutional guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the State, the goal it 
expresses is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants." 272  Just as Rehnquist did in 
Adams273, Scalia here re-writes the 6th Amendment to protect heretofore unmentioned (in the 
Constitution) rights of the State.
While ruling against Holland's fair cross section claim, Scalia admitted that an Equal 
Protection case against race based juror exclusion would have merit. "We do not hold that the 
systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system through peremptory challenges is lawful; it 
obviously is not. We do not even hold that the exclusion of blacks through peremptory 
challenges in this particular trial was lawful. Nor do we even hold that this particular (white) 
defendant does not have a valid constitutional challenge to such racial exclusion. All we hold is 
that he does not have a valid constitutional challenge based on the Sixth Amendment."274  In fact, 
Scalia argues that while the 6th Amendment establishes only the need for a representative jury 
pool not a representative jury, and was therefore satisfied in Holland's case, the 14th Amendment 
by contrast applies to both the pool and the resulting jury. "The Fourteenth Amendment's 
270
 Id. at 484.
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 Id. at 478. In his dissent in J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994) at 163, Scalia added that peremptory challenges 
were "an essential part of fair jury trial since the dawn of common law." To limit challenges in any way 
would be "vandalizing our people's traditions."
272 Holland v. Illinois 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990) (emphasis added).
273 Adams v. Texas 448 U.S. 38, 55 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
274 Holland v. Illinois 493 U.S. 474, 486-487 (1990).
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prohibition of unequal treatment in general and racial discrimination in particular …has equal 
application at the petit jury and the venire stages, as our cases have long recognized."275
In dissent, Marshall objected to the Court's distinction between the goals of an impartial 
jury and a fair cross section jury.  Arguing that the latter goal does not serve the former is "a 
false dichotomy."276 Also writing in dissent, Stevens echoed the sentiment: "A jury that is the 
product of such a racially discriminatory selection process cannot possibly be an 'impartial jury' 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment."277
By refusing to apply the fair cross section requirement, Marshall argued the Court 
empowered "prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude Afro-American 
prospective jurors on the ground that they, as a class, lack the intelligence or impartiality fairly to 
fill the juror's role"278
The next year Powers v. Ohio279 brought much the same facts to the Court as did 
Holland.  Larry Joe Powers was a white defendant who objected to the prosecution's use of 
peremptory challenges to eliminate African Americans from his jury. Unlike Holland, Powers 
advanced an Equal Protection argument rather than a fair cross section argument.
The Court, in a 7 to 2 decision, agreed that "The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a 
prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and 
unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race."280
275
 Id. at 479.
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 Id. at 493 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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 Id. at 506 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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 Id. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Scalia is dismissive of Marshall's conclusion: "JUSTICE 
MARSHALL's dissent rolls out the ultimate weapon, the accusation of insensitivity to racial 
discrimination - which will lose its intimidating effect if it continues to be fired so randomly." (Id. at 486).
279 Powers v. Ohio 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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Kennedy, writing for the Court, quoted Scalia's opinion in Holland. "As the Holland
Court made explicit, however, racial exclusion of prospective jurors violates the overriding 
command of the Equal Protection Clause, and 'race-based exclusion is no more permissible at the 
individual petit jury stage than at the venire stage.'"281  The Court ruled that not only the plaintiff 
but the prospective jurors themselves have a right to a selection process not based on race.282
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, vigorously dissented from the decision founded on Scalia's own 
words.
Where Scalia asserted in Holland that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to racial 
exclusion, but Equal Protection did, a year later he realized, "What is true with respect to the 
Sixth Amendment is true with respect to the Equal Protection Clause as well."283  In other words, 
neither applied to Powers' claim.
Scalia fumed that nothing in the Court's decision in Strauder284 compelled the protection 
of a white defendant from a jury process which excluded African Americans. "It was not 
suggested in Strauder, and I am sure it was quite unthinkable, that a white defendant could have 
had his conviction reversed on the basis of" a process which "did not exclude members of his 
race."285  Scalia did not emphasize that the case in which "it was quite unthinkable" was decided 
more than 100 years earlier, in a time of rampant legal segregation.  Moreover, if Strauder was
the controlling precedent in Powers, surely it was the controlling precedent a year earlier in 
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 Id. at 409.
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 Unlike Rehnquist's conclusion in Duren that jury service was "time consuming" and "usless," the 
majority in Powers spoke of it in valued terms. “Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the 
excluded jurors and the community at large” [Powers v. Ohio 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991)] by depriving 
them of a “a significant opportunity to participate in civic life.” (Id. at 409)  “Indeed, with the exception 
of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to 
participate in the democratic process." (Id. at 407)
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284 Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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Holland when Scalia wrote for the Court: "We do not hold that the systematic exclusion of 
blacks from the jury system through peremptory challenges is lawful; it obviously is not."286
In a new formulation, however, Scalia realized that the systematic exclusion of African 
Americans from jury service by prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges is actually an 
indication of equality. "When that group, like all others, has been made subject to peremptory 
challenge on the basis of its group characteristic, its members have been treated not differently, 
but the same. In fact, it would constitute discrimination to exempt them from the peremptory 
strike exposure to which all others are subject. If, for example, men were permitted to be struck 
but not women, or fundamentalists but not atheists, or blacks but not whites, members of the 
former groups would plainly be the object of discrimination."287
That logic would support innumerable legal conclusions – it would be perfectly 
reasonable to ban African Americans from part of a bus, say the front, if you banned whites from 
part of the bus, say the back, because in that case everyone would be barred from part of the bus.  
Indeed, the majority casts Scalia's position in just such a light. "The suggestion that racial 
classifications may survive when visited upon all persons is no more authoritative today than the 
case which advanced the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). This idea has no place in our 
modern equal protection jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become 
legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree."288
286 Holland v. Illinois 493 U.S. 474, 486-487 (1990)..
287 Powers v. Ohio 499 U.S. 400, 424 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a related point, Rehnquist 
has advanced the notion that if you subscribe to notions of equality, you must understand the 
exclusion of any particular group from a jury to be irrelevant. That is, when the Court argues 
women and men are equal, Rehnquist reasons such equality eliminates any need for their fair 
representation. "If, then, men and women are essentially fungible for purposes of jury duty, the 
question arises how underrepresentation of either sex on the jury or the venire infringes on a 
defendant's right to have his fate decided by an impartial tribunal." [Duren v. Missouri 439 U.S. 
357, 371 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)]. 
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As Rehnquist argued in his Batson dissent, Scalia here reminds us that race based use of 
peremptory challenges is inherently rational. "A peremptory strike on the basis of group 
membership implies nothing more than the undeniable reality (upon which the peremptory strike 
system is largely based) that all groups tend to have particular sympathies and hostilities."289
Scalia also reminded us that the thrust of the Court's thinking endangers peremptory 
challenges. "To affirm that the Equal Protection Clause applies to strikes of individual jurors is 
effectively to abolish the peremptory challenge."290 Instead peremptory challenges must be 
protected because they ensure "the jury will be the fairest possible."291 The notion that 
peremptory challenges could have unconstitutional consequences "is implausible" because they 
are "such a  permanent and universal feature of our jury-trial system."292
But that logic implies that it is impossible to use a legal tactic for nefarious purposes. 
That is the very essence of this case; not that peremptory challenges are unconstitutional, but that 
using them for racial purposes would be.  Similarly, the state's power to arrest and prosecute are 
"permanent and universal" features, but nothing in their ubiquity prevents them from being 
marshaled for discriminatory purposes and ultimately being subject to limitation.
Finally, Scalia noted that protecting the individual juror, rather than the defendant, from 
exclusion is also specious. "We have never held, or even said, that a juror has an equal protection 
right not to be excluded from a particular case through peremptory challenge."293  Scalia neatly 
overlooked federal law. Section 243 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 provides: 
"No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law 
shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or 
of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
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In Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)294, the prosecution in Dallas County, Texas used 10 
peremptory challenges to remove African Americans from the capital jury.
In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court found "substantial evidence" of racial bias in jury 
selection, in violation of principles held in Batson, and therefore restored Miller-El's ability to 
appeal his sentence.295
The prosecution in the case not only used peremptories against African Americans, but 
treated African Americans disparately throughout the voir dire process.  While whites were 
typically asked for their thoughts on the death penalty without preface, African Americans were 
first told what the death penalty means ("Thomas Joe Miller-El will be taken to Huntsville, 
Texas. He will be placed on death row and at some time will be taken to the death house where 
he will be strapped on a gurney, an IV put into his arm and he will be injected with a substance 
that will cause his death"296) and then asked the question. While whites were typically told what 
the minimum sentence would be if the defendant was convicted and then asked if they could 
impose it, African Americans were not told what the minimum sentence was and were asked 
only what it should be.  Thus, "prosecutors designed their questions to elicit responses that would 
justify the removal of African-Americans from the venire."297
The defense unearthed evidence that discrimination against jurors was a standing practice 
in the prosecutor's office. A sitting judge testified that when he worked in prosecutor's office  
superiors had told him not to allow African Americans on juries. A Dallas County district 
attorney memo from the 1960s –  known to at least one of the prosecutors in the present case –
instructed prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges against minorities: "Do not take Jews, 
294 Miller- El v. Cockrell 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
295
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Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or 
how well educated."298
Taking up the mantle of defending exclusion in this case was Thomas. In dissent, Thomas 
called the defense's allegations "entirely circumstantial."299
Why did the prosecutor ask whites and African Americans different questions? 
According to Thomas: "The strategy pursued by the prosecution makes perfect sense: When it 
was necessary to draw out a venireman's feelings about the death penalty they would use the 
graphic script, but when it was overkill they would not."300
The slight logical flaw in that position is that the description of execution preceded the 
question on the death penalty – thus the "strategy" that "makes perfect sense" would have also 
required the prosecutor to see into the future. Thomas concedes the point: "I recognize that 
these voir dire statements only indirectly support respondent's explanation because the graphic 
script was typically given at the outset of voir dire--before the above quoted veniremen had the 
chance to give their stark answers."301
Even so, after conducting his own analysis in which he compared the treatment of 
individual white and African American prospective jurors, Thomas disputed that race was related 
to the type of questions the prosecutor asked.  After all, in Thomas' calculation: "race predicted 
use of the graphic script only 74% of the time."302
After the Court affirmed Miller-El's right to proceed with his appeal, lower courts 
rejected his contention that his jury had been constructed with a racial blueprint.  Miller-El's 
appeal of that conclusion would itself be aired before the Court in 2005 (Miller-El v. Dretke).
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In a 6 to 3 decision, the Court found "clear and convincing" evidence of racial bias 
indicated by the overall pattern in jury selection ("By the time a jury was chosen, the State had 
peremptorily challenged 12% of qualified nonblack panel members, but eliminated 91% of the 
black ones. It blinks reality to deny that the State struck [jurors] because they were black."), the 
disparate questioning of white and African Americans during voir dire, and the irreconcilable use 
of explanations to justify the removal of African Americans while similarly situated whites were 
accepted ("Nonblack jurors whose remarks on rehabilitation could well have signaled a limit on 
their willingness to impose a death sentence were not questioned further and drew no objection, 
but the prosecution expressed apprehension about a black juror's belief in the possibility of 
reformation even though he repeatedly stated his approval of the death penalty and testified that 
he could impose it according to state legal standards…").303
To the majority, "the very integrity of the courts is jeopardized" when prosecutors 
respond to potential jurors based on "illegitimate grounds like race."304
303
 Beyond the overall pattern discerned, the prosecution's position that race was not a factor in their 
behavior was undermined by repeated misstatements and misrepresentations.  Most blatantly, when asked 
why the race of potential jurors was noted by prosecutors on their pre-trial records: "The State claimed at 
oral argument that prosecutors could have been tracking jurors' races to be sure of avoiding a Batson
violation. Batson, of course, was decided the month after Miller-El was tried." (Id. at XX).
304
 Breyer, in a concurring opinion, agreed that race was the basis for the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges.  Breyer, harkening back to Marshall's concurrence in Batson, questioned whether it was
possible to achieve a peremptory challenge system free from the infection of race.  Breyer noted that 
despite the Batson ruling, there was no shortage of social science evidence that race continues to be a 
potent factor in jury selection, indeed  "the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection 
process seems better organized and more systematized than ever before." Numerous studies have shown 
prosecutors to be twice as likely to strike African Americans as whites, and defense attorneys twice as 
likely to strike whites as African Americans. Indeed, Breyer found several popular guides to jury 
selection used by attorneys which highlighted race as a factor in predicting a juror's value.  Breyer 
concluded, "If used to express stereotypical judgments about race, gender, religion, or national origin, 
peremptory challenges betray the jury's democratic origins and undermine its representative function" 
thus "I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole."
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In a dissent joined by Rehnquist and Scalia, Thomas again took exception to Miller-El's 
claim that race was a factor in jury selection.  Referring to the case as "the antithesis of clear and 
convincing evidence," Thomas's analysis found no hint of racialized thinking or behavior.
Thomas rejected the majority's contention that whites and African Americans with 
similar voir dire responses were treated differently.  "To isolate race as a variable," Thomas 
wrote, would require that "the jurors must be comparable in all respects that the prosecutor 
proffers as important."  In other words, a prosecutor could never be found to violate the 
prohibition on using race in jury selection because any difference the prosecutor identifies would 
justify disparate treatment.305
Indeed, Thomas noted that "any number of characteristics other than race could have 
been apparent to prosecutors from a visual inspection of the jury panel."  What those factors 
would be, other than similarly proscribed gender, Thomas did not specify.
Even were prospective white and African American jurors in Miller-El's case identical in 
thinking, background, and all other respects, however, Thomas warned that comparisons of their 
treatment still would not be meaningful.  Whites, Thomas noted, "were questioned much later in 
the jury selection process, when the State had fewer peremptories to spare" thus requiring a 
different strategic response.  
Thomas' conclusion is somewhat ironic given that his attention to comparisons of 
individual jurors in the first Miller-El case was at the heart of his conclusion that race was not a 
factor, and was central to the majority's interest in conducting its own comparison of individual 
jurors in the second Miller- El case.  Apparently, then, Thomas has concluded that Whites and 
Africans Americans were not similarly situated enough that differences in their treatment reveal 
305
 As Marshall warned in his Batson concurrence, deference to the post hoc explanations of prosecutors 
would produce a litany of intangible distinctions which (e.g., "he didn't smile right) by their very nature 
could never be disproved.
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anything about racial disparities.  At the same time, however, he has also concluded that Whites 
and African Americans were similarly situated enough that similarities in their treatment reveal 
the absence of racial disparities.
Indeed, Thomas held up several examples of whites who were treated similarly to African 
Americans.  Even more forcefully, Thomas pointed to prospective white jurors who were more 
favorable to the death penalty than several African Americans, but were nevertheless struck from 
the panel by the prosecution.  For example, Thomas scolded the majority for failing to explain 
why the prosecution struck "Penny Crowson, a white panelist who expressed a firm belief in the 
death penalty."  Thomas’ choice of Crowson as an exemplar of his case suggests how little 
foundation existed for his position.  That is, although Thomas did not note it in his dissent,
Crowson has said in voir dire that she would "hate to have to take [it] upon myself" to "dispose 
of" another human being, and that she believed the death penalty should be reserved for an 
extremely narrow group of repeat offenders.306 It is odd that Thomas used Crowson as an 
example of the prosecution’s fairness. Indeed, one wonders how Thomas concluded Crowson 
had a "firm belief in the death penalty"?  The answer: that precise phrase, without explanation or 
justification, appeared twice in the state's brief for the case.
Miller-El's cases demonstrate the depth of Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist's deference to 
the prosecution.  Even under Thomas' highly favorable accounting, race accounted for 74% of 
the state's questioning pattern in voir dire.  But the prosecution said race did not matter – so race 
did not matter.  But this deference has the effect of nullifying the rights of the defendant.
306
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Overall the racial exclusion cases demonstrate the conservatives’ tendency to redefine the 
issue – first by questioning that exclusion is wrong, then by questioning that it happens, then by 
questioning that it matters.   Even as Miller-El successfully appealed the prosecution’s racial 
blueprint for his case, his experience only serves to dramatize the absurdly high bar one must 
clear to demonstrate discrimination in jury selection.  Miller-El had not only stark numbers on 
his side but a clear and unmistakable pattern of differential treatment infecting all phases of the 
jury selection process and a documented history of racist jury selection.  In the Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Thomas view, the resulting right, in effect, is not to a jury of one’s peers, but to a jury 
selected by anything short of boastfully racist procedures.
Conclusion
Jury service "is not a pleasant experience in many jurisdictions" as it "tends to 
be time consuming and often seemingly useless from the point of view of the 
prospective juror" – Justice Rehnquist 307
With the participation of the Court's most conservative members, the right to a jury 
determination of a capital defendant's fate has expanded. The era of judges making factual 
determinations then determining whether to apply a death sentence (for example in Arizona) or 
judges having the power to overrule a jury's life sentence to impose death (for example in 
Florida) are over.
The expanded right to access a jury and have it hold determinative power over a 
defendant's life has not, however, been accompanied by commensurate attention to the 
instructions that guide those jurors through the applicable law toward their verdict. Nor have 
adequate procedures been designed to produce a truly representative jury panel.
307 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 376 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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In brief, the right to a jury has been enhanced without concern for the government’s 
obligations necessary to animate that right. This contradiction has clear consequences.  A capital 
defendant puts his life in the hands of a group we have strong reason to suspect will have 
difficulty understanding their instructions, difficulty defining and applying mitigating evidence,
and uncertainty regarding the true meaning of the sentences available to them.  Moreover, that 
group was assembled systematically to be unrepresentative of community mores.
In the cases highlighted here, dealing with mitigation instructions, the definition of 
sentences, belief exclusion, and trait exclusion, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas have led the 
Court toward a laissez faire position on the jury system.  They assert there is no problem.  They 
offer unfalsiable evidence that the jury functioned properly.  If a problem arises, they assert it has 
no consequence.  If it has a consequence, they assert it was permissible because the problem 
could have happened by chance, or was inevitable, or affected only some jurors, or served their 
newly discovered state’s right to an impartial trial.  
Even as they strongly advance their arguments, their standards for defining an acceptable 
jury system are slippery.  This is perhaps best embodied by a comparison of the logic raised in 
response to the use of peremptory challenges.  When the state used peremptory challenges to 
eliminate African Americans from the jury, Scalia declared the right to unfettered use of 
peremptory challenges must never be thwarted because the Constitution’s guarantee of an 
impartial jury "compels peremptory challenges."308 Scalia added that peremptory challenges are a  
“permanent and universal feature of our jury-trial system"309 which serves to ensure "the jury 
308 Holland at 482 (emphasis added).
309 Powers at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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will be the fairest possible."310 Similarly, Rehnquist noted “the historic scope of the peremptory 
challenge, which has been described as 'a necessary part of trial by jury.'"311
When a defendant lost a peremptory challenge to a judge’s failure to remove what 
Rehnquist called “an incompetent juror” however, the historic, permanent and universal, 
compelled nature of peremptory challenges took on a different hue.  The defense’s loss of a 
peremptory was in Rehnquist’s words (joined by Scalia): not a "constitutional problem" because 
"we reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional right to an impartial jury" as "peremptory challenges are not of constitutional 
dimension."312
Whether in response to peremptory challenges, or the many other issues raised here, the 
conservatives on the Court come perilously close to defining a “fair jury” as falling within the 
parameters of whatever happened to occur in a particular case.  Thus, under Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Thomas’ views, the capital defendant’s right to access a jury expands while his right to 
access an impartial jury contracts.
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